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DMZ Domain

On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 11:46:47 -0700, Steve Goddard <...@discussions.microsoft.com

Hey Guys,

I've always worked with a DMZ domain but after reading into my MCSE stuff I
find a strong case for creating and managing the one domain.

The more I think about I just think that the DMZ just doesn't have a case
for separation. High Security can be applied by GPO's on that OU, domain
admin accounts can should already be secured by policy and we should all use
secondary non-admin accounts for any machine.

I'm just interested to hear anyt comments on - is there any point for a
second domain when you can easily secure and manage the one domain?

Steve.

--
Steve G.
MCSA 2003 +M



On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 18:56:07 +0000 (UTC), Meinolf Weber [MVP-DS] <...@gmx.de

Hello Steve,

In a DMZ you should place servers like webservers or mail servers, which
are also accessible from outside your network(Internet). So even if they
are compromised the internal network is secured.

Domain internal you can secure with GPO's and carefully handing out account's
with administrative permissions. Also you can apply security templates on
all machines, either self-created ones or some of the included templates.

Best regards

Meinolf Weber
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On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 12:39:19 -0700, Steve Goddard <...@discussions.microsoft.com

Thanks for your response, I appreciate you place in the DMZ domain servers
that are exposed to the internet but I wonder how exactly we are more
secured? We've probably opened the ports and traffic type to allow DC's in
the DMZ through to the unsecured network or if we've placed DC's only in the
unsecured domain then we've opened the servers to communicate to the DC's.

So if any server is hacked then its plausable that each server can lead to
the DC and from there back to the unsecured network. Do we gain anything by
creating a domain for DMZ?

--
Steve G.
MCSA 2003 +M

>

On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 19:50:49 +0000 (UTC), Meinolf Weber [MVP-DS] <...@gmx.de

Hello Steve,

If possible do not place DC's in a DMZ.

See also here:
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/expert/KnowledgebaseAnswer/0,289625,sid14_ gci1320952,00.html

http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-22_11-5238083.html

See "Windows 2000 domain controller hardening "
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc750019.aspx

Also an option is to use windows server 2008 RODC's in the future for a DMZ.
Unfortunal the "How to" is not ready until now, but will come.

Best regards

Meinolf Weber
Disclaimer: This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers
no rights.
** Please do NOT email, only reply to Newsgroups
** HELP us help YOU!!! http://www.blakjak.demon.co.uk/mul_crss.htm


On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 13:10:34 -0700, Steve Goddard <...@discussions.microsoft.com

Thanks Meinolf,

Yes the Read-only DC is a new option that I think does in fact make a DMZ a
workable option. I admit I haven't yet started 2008 design or study, I
presume we need a standard read/write DC somewhere on that domain.

So that brings me back to the design of a read/write DC and FSMO domain
roles on the other side of the firewall and a read-only DC on the DMZ? Does
that sound secure? We still have ports open through the firewall but its the
most secure design I can think of.

Steve.

--
Steve G.
MCSA 2003 +M

>

On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 20:33:45 +0000 (UTC), Meinolf Weber [MVP-DS] <...@gmx.de

Hello Steve,

It sounds more scure with a RODC, yes. But the most secure way is still to
avoid this kind of configuration.

Best regards

Meinolf Weber
Disclaimer: This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers
no rights.
** Please do NOT email, only reply to Newsgroups
** HELP us help YOU!!! http://www.blakjak.demon.co.uk/mul_crss.htm


On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 17:13:45 -0400, "Ace Fekay [Microsoft Certified Trainer]" <...@mvps.RemoveThisPart.org

"Meinolf Weber [MVP-DS]" <...@msnews.microsoft.com...

I must agree.

Ace


On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 15:44:49 -0400, "Ace Fekay [Microsoft Certified Trainer]" <...@mvps.RemoveThisPart.org

"Steve Goddard" <...@microsoft.com...

Hello Steve,

Do you realize how many ports DC/domain communication requires? There are 29
ports plus the emepheral Windows response ports (UDP 1024 - 5000) that need
to be opened. I wouldn't suggest such a design. In any design for a DMZ, I
like to lean on machines that are not joined to a domain. If you use
Exchange, you can put an Edge server in the DMZ and just create port 25
rules for communication between the Edge and the internal HUB.

I usually like to take the KISS method trying to achieve the best secure
design in such a scenario. Placing an AD domain complicates it and makes it
more difficult to track and audit.

--
Ace

This posting is provided "AS-IS" with no warranties or guarantees and
confers no rights.

Ace Fekay, MCSE 2003 & 2000, MCSA 2003 & 2000, MCSA Messaging, MCT
Microsoft Certified Trainer
acem...@mvps.RemoveThisPart.org

For urgent issues, you may want to contact Microsoft PSS directly. Please
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On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 13:00:50 -0700, Steve Goddard <...@discussions.microsoft.com

I've found that problem and I suppose thats one of the reasons why I put the
post here. Its a strand of a thougt, a server in the DMZ with no affiliation
to a domain seems like the only secure method but the trade-off is the
complete lack of management via a domain.

I'm aware of the flexible range of ports required to get a server to talk to
DC, the quick solution is to put a DC in the DMZ but I wondered if at that
point you shouldn't bother and just have the one domain.

Apologies if I'm rambling, its a topic that I would love to debate with
real-life varied experiences other than my own.

Steve

--
Steve G.
MCSA 2003 +M

>

On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 17:44:17 -0400, "Ace Fekay [Microsoft Certified Trainer]" <...@mvps.RemoveThisPart.org

"Steve Goddard" <...@microsoft.com...

No apologies needed, Steve. I understand trying to create a more versatile
solution, and trying to take into account all options, but a domain or a DC
in a DMZ is normally not a 'best practice' recommended by anyone. Just keep
with the one domain internally and put your web and other non-domain
machines offering outside access into the DMZ.

Curious, what stipulations does your design have to require such a scenario?

Ace


On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 15:49:16 -0500, "Paul Bergson [MVP-DS]" <...@nopspam_msn.com

There is the option to use IPSec between this server and a dc, thereby
reducing the port open count to 2.

I will be honest I have never tested this and only read documents on it but
is another option and I have heard it works well.
http://blog.studiographic.nl/?p=193

--
Paul Bergson
MVP - Directory Services
MCTS, MCT, MCSE, MCSA, Security+, BS CSci
2008, 2003, 2000 (Early Achiever), NT4

http://www.pbbergs.com

Please no e-mails, any questions should be posted in the NewsGroup This
posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.

"Steve Goddard" <...@microsoft.com...

On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 17:48:46 -0400, "Ace Fekay [Microsoft Certified Trainer]" <...@mvps.RemoveThisPart.org

"Paul Bergson [MVP-DS]" <...@microsoft.com...

I've actually tested this in classroom scenarios using my own Cisco Pix and
it works fine. The ports that would need to be open for L2TP/IPSec (assuming
you are referring to an L2TP tunnel), IIRC, would actually be 4. I guess if
no tunnel, then it would be 3 (minus the 1701 for the tunnel).

TCP 1701 (for L2TP)
UDP 500 (for the SA or ISKMP)
Protocol ID 50 (for ESP)
Protocol ID 51 (for AH)

Ace


Discussion Title: DMZ Domain
Title Keywords: Domain