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JACKKNIFED ...the collapse of the Teamsters in the freight industry - C. L. Writers' Forum

JACKKNIFED …the collapse of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in the freight industry On Tuesday, February 24, James P.

“Junior” Hoffa, the General President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Change To Win (CTW)/Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), hailed Section 136 of the Omnibus Spending Bill, an amendment that would order the defunding of a small scale program that lets a few handpicked Mexican freight lines haul freight into the United States. The program, which allows 500 carefully inspected, fully insured trucks, driven by union truckers who are paid American-level per diems in addition to their Mexican hourly wages and mileage rate pay, to cross into the US. Most of the cargo is agricultural products - mostly fruit baskets hauled from Baja California Norte state in Mexico to rural California’s Imperial Valley area. And, international law-wise, the program barely complies with the North American Free Trade Agreement that President Bill Clinton signed with the Commonwealth of Canada and the United States of Mexico back in 1994. Canadian carriers have been hauling into 49 of America’s 50 states (every state save Hawaii – for obvious geographic reasons) and the District of Columbia since 1992, 2 years before NAFTA was signed – and American carriers can transport freight into all 10 provinces and 3 territories of Canada. American carriers can freely haul into all 31 Mexican states and the Distrito Federal de Mexico too – all the way from the Rio Grande to the Guatemalan border. But Mexican trucking lines can only haul into a 20 mile strip of California, New Mexico and Texas and a 75 mile strip of Arizona - both immediately adjacent to the Mexican border - and that’s it, they are barred entirely from the roads of the other 46 states. Needless to say, Section 136 is in blatant violation of the NAFTA treaty. Now I’m sure that Junior Hoffa would object here, and quite correctly, that labor rights are far more important than a treaty between governments. And he has a point. Indeed, Mexico has the lowest wage scale in the NAFTA Zone – specifically in the case of freight workers, the highest paid unionized Mexican truckers are paid about half what the average American teamster freight hauler is paid (the equivalent of $ 19,000 a year for the Mexican drivers to the American teamster’s $ 47,000 a year) And those are the best paid union drivers in Northern Mexico – truck drivers in the Distrito Federal/Central Mexico area get paid less, and drivers in Southern Mexico are paid the least. That follows a general pattern of almost all Mexican wages, including the minimum wage – Northern is highest, D.F./Central is lower, and Southern is the lowest. Considering how much Mexican road freight is destined for the American market (the freight corridor running from Nuevo Laredo, Mexico to Chicago is the busiest road freight route on the planet) that would be a good argument for demanding that Mexican freight drivers (Northern, Distrito Federal/Central and Southern alike) all get that same 56 cents per mile and $ 22.65/hr for non driving work their unionized American brothers and sisters are paid. An argument that Junior Hoffa should definitely bring up the next time he meets with the leaders of Mexico’s trucking industry unions. Then again, Junior might have to do more listening than talking. Mexico’s transportation unions have 27% of the country’s trucking industry unionized. By contrast, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters only represents 4% of this country’s over the road truck drivers – only 88,000 out of 2 million workers! Back in 1966, he last full year that Junior’s dad, James R.

“Jimmy” Hoffa, ran the union, the Teamsters represented 400,000 of this country’s half million road freight workers. But then Hoffa Senior went to prison – and Jimmy’s hand picked successor, Frank “Fitz” Fitzsimmons, signed an agreement letting unionized trucking companies hire an unlimited number of non union drivers back in 1973. That so called ‘Special Commodities Rider’ was intended to break the militancy of American truckers, who had carried out the largest wildcat strike in American history in 1970 – 200,000 of them walked off the job because they didn’t like the contract Fitz had negotiated for them. The trucking companies represented by the Motor Freight Carriers Association had gotten a solemn promise from Hoffa Senior back in 1964 that the IBT leadership of would never ever allow truck drivers to call a national freight strike. That promise to the bosses was why the MFCA even agreed to one national union agreement in the first place. Fitzsimmons broke that promise when he didn’t crush the wildcat strike – so the carriers demanded – and got - the right to hire an unlimited number of non union workers and to deunionize as many of their freight runs as they wished, to calm trucker labor militancy with the threat of permanent layoffs and deunionization. And the Special Commodities Rider and the resultant union trucker job loss did indeed help to crush the militancy of American truckers. It also broke the Teamsters as a freight union – within a decade, the majority of the industry was non union, as it remains to this day. It also transformed over the road trucking from being a very well paid job with one of the best union contracts in the nation into a low paying non union job with wages that, on an hourly wage basis, are only slightly higher than McDonalds. The big “DRIVERS WANTED” signs permanently painted on the backs of many non union trucking companies rigs are mute testimony to the low pay and miserable working conditions of the post 1973 trucking industry. The job – once a career occupation that people got into right out of high school and stayed with until retirement – now has a very high employee turnover rate and a revolving door of drivers who get hired, and then quit or get fired, and replaced by other drivers, who quit or get fired ect ect ect. Some drivers get so disgusted that they literally abandon their rigs by the roadside and the big non union carriers have to keep drivers on standby to pick up the trucks and finish their routes. In light of that history, perhaps Junior should spent a little less time worrying about 500 unionized truckers from Mexico hauling across the border, and start seriously trying to organize 1.9 million non union American truckers (many of whom, like the Mexican drivers, have to get by on $ 19,000 a year….or less). Not to mention all those low paid Canadian drivers who carry freight all over this country as well – for similarly minimal wages. As for the Mexicans – perhaps they can handle their labor struggles on their own quite nicely without Brother Hoffa’s assistance. After all, the truck and bus drivers unions affiliated to the CTM [Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico “Confederation of Mexican Workers”] did manage to call a one day national truck and bus drivers strike back in February 2008, in protest of skyrocketing diesel fuel prices – with over 500,000 truckers and bus drivers parking their rigs for the day. The only truckers strikes against the fuel price increases on this side of the border were wildcat strikes by drivers in Virginia, Washington State and California – and none of those strikes were official International Brotherhood of Teamsters walkouts, they were independent strikes by non IBT-affiliated truckers organizations. The Teamsters didn’t do anything to protest against fuel price increases – even though that’s a bread and butter issue for owner operator drivers (workers who own their own trucks and trailers and haul freight for carriers on a fee per trip basis) – and even the employee drivers’ incomes are threatened by fuel price increases. And, in terms of strikes in general, the Teamsters has never been able to lead a half million worker walkout in it’s 106 year history. The biggest officially sanctioned IBT strike ever was the 185,000 UPS worker strike back in 1997. The biggest Teamster strike period was the 200,000 worker freight wildcat strike of 1970 (a walkout that the Teamsters union leaders of the day were very aggressively and quite violently OPPOSED TO!). Before that, the only really big teamster strikes were the big freight driver strikes in San Francisco, Minneapolis and Omaha in the 1930’s that unionized road freight in the first place. In terms of freight worker organizing, the IBT has done a poor job. Other than the campaign to unionize UPS’s non union freight subsidiary, UPS Freight, and the organizing drive at Airborne Express/DHL Express’ non union delivery subcontractors, and the very much partial success of the USF Reddaway organizing campaign, every other Teamsters Union trucker organizing drive in the US and Canada for the last 20 years has been a failure;

The port trucker organizing campaign, Pony Express, Central Freight, USF Red Star, Overnite Transportation [until it was purchased by UPS and became UPS Freight]. The tiny Industrial Workers of the World has actually done a better job of truck driver organizing than the IBT! Almost all Teamster membership increases over the past two decades have come from the IBT taking over smaller unions – only one of which, the 1,500 member New York City Newspaper Drivers and Mail Deliverers Union, was an actual truck driver union (the rest were various collapsing railroad worker or printers unions who joined the Teamsters to keep from disbanding entirely). Of course, the Teamsters leadership might be a little too busy to ask the Mexican freight union leaders for labor struggle advice (no matter how badly they might actually need to!) The IBT has been extremely occupied with negotiating pay cuts for the handful of freight drivers who are still union represented in this country – Yellow Roadway, which employs 40,000 of the 88,000 road freight drivers left in the Teamsters, got a 10% pay cut and a 4 year pay freeze from Hoffa just last month. Double breasted carrier and Yellow Roadway subsidiary USF Reddaway is asking for the same pay cuts for the half of it’s workers who are Teamsters (with no wage cuts for the non union half of their freight workforce). Perhaps all of the Teamsters Union’s Lou Dobbsean ranting and raving about “the Mexicans” and their “Dangerous Trucks” is intended as a distraction? Maybe, the intent is to make American freight drivers and dockworkers forget the fact that it is the Teamsters and the American freight industry who have butchered their standard of living, not their brothers and sisters behind the wheel south of the border? In any case, not only is the Teamsters Union all but irrelevant in the freight industry today, but the union has also been under the yoke of a federal court monitorship for the last 21 years. And that two decades of massive federal meddling in Teamsters Union internal affairs would never have happened but for 85 years of collaboration between local, regional and national IBT officers and various and sundry organized crime groups. In any case, the anti racketeering monitorship – and all the day to day Department of Justice and FBI interference in Teamsters Union business certainly puts a crimp in the IBT’s independent activities as a labor union. The question is, how did a union that was once so strong and powerful get into it’s present state of decay? And what does it mean for the rest of the working class – in particular blue collar workers, who’s wages are directly or indirectly pegged to Teamster pay and benefits – that such a decisive union get into it’s present state of collapse? And what can be done to rebuild unionism in the road freight industry? To understand the crisis in the Teamsters, we need to start at the beginning. Back in 1903, delegates from several “team drivers” unions (motor trucks were an expensive novelty back then – local freight was still delivered in wagons drawn by teams of horses…which were driven by “teamsters” – the occupational name stuck even after they switched from horses to diesel engine-powered motor trucks in the 1920’s) met in Niagara Falls, NY, with the intent of founding one unified national labor organization. They organized the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, which immediately affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and the Trades & Labour Congress of Canada. The Teamsters was one of the last major national craft unions to be founded – their skilled trades counterparts in construction and the metal trades had built national unions two or three decades earlier.

On the other side of the working class, unskilled blue collar workers were still a generation away from founding their unions. Unlike earlier unions, which, at first, were more or less socialist oriented, the IBT was founded in a time when the right wing of the labor movement was dominant. The socialists, communists and anarchists who’d given birth to the early unions, and who saw labor organizing as the first step towards what they called a “Cooperative Commonwealth” [that is, a vision of a nation and a world ruled by workers, not by capitalists and financiers] were pushed aside by conservative pro-employer oriented business unionists, labor racketeers and racists. The “labor statesmen”, gangster unionists and bigots reoriented American labor away from class struggle and a vision of an equal society to a view of labor as the representative of a narrow, privileged layer of relatively well paid American-born White workers, who saw themselves as junior partners to the capitalist system. The Teamsters union was born after this decisive turning point had been reached – and that reflected itself in many ways. Initially, the Teamsters included the owners of small trucking companies and self employed drivers side by side with employee drivers – a very controversial matter that caused much internal conflict in the early IBT. There was also the matter of warehouse and truck terminal workers. Many of the better off team drivers (ESPECIALLY the owner operators and small fleet owners) looked down on the loading dock workers, and wanted to keep them out of the union entirely. Some of more far sighted Teamsters Union leaders saw that this was a really dumb idea – since the union would be far more secure if it included all workers in the local drayage [freight delivery] industry, not just the guys who drove the horses and their helpers. There was also the matter of racketeering. The strongest local Teamsters Unions were in Boston, New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and Chicago – all areas with a heavy organized crime presence. Particularly in Chicago, the birth of the Teamsters was intimately tied with the rise of organized crime, and it’s transition away from petty street gang activity into what would come to be called “racketeering” (gangsters helping legitimate businesses do illegal things for commercial gain, in return for bribes and/or tribute). At least one Chicago Teamsters local, the meat wagon drivers union, was created explicitly as part of a conspiracy by a Chicago gangster to help protect major meat dealers in the Chicago Stockyards from competition from smaller dealers The Teamsters Union was a junior partner in this – it’s role was to enforce union rules on weaker companies, but not on the dominant firms, so as to prevent those little companies from breaking into the meat wholesaling market. That particular scam would become the template for labor racketeering for the next 100 years – it was probably the first such racket, unfortunately it was not the last. The first major strike by the IBT had similar underworld origins. In 1905, just 2 years after the IBT’s founding, Teamsters General President Cornelius “Con” Shea, called a strike against the Montgomery Ward Co. Montgomery Ward was a mail order house – a company that sold various types of consumer goods via catalogues sent to customers all over the country, who mailed in their orders and had the goods shipped to them by parcel post. Like most mail order houses of the day, they were headquartered in Chicago, then as now the main hub of land freight transportation in the United States. In 1904, the workers in Montgomery Ward’s in house garment factory had gone on strike and their union, the United Garment Workers of America, asked the IBT and the other unions at the company to carry out a sympathy strike – a call that fell on deaf ears. Six months later, the UGWA was still, officially, on strike – and then, at that point, the Teamsters decided to call a sympathy strike (after the striking seamstresses and garment cutters had long since been fired and replaced by scabs). It would later come out that Montgomery Ward’s commercial rivals in the mail order business had bribed Teamsters General President Con Shea to call the strike, so they could take market share away from the strike idled company. As if that wasn’t ugly enough, the strike soon took a vicious racial turn. Montgomery Ward had maintained a jim crow hiring policy at it’s Chicago mail order house, so the teamster workforce there were all White. Once the strike began, the company went out and hired several hundred African American scabs from the South, and brought them in to do the work of the strikers. The Teamsters Union took the racial bait – and upped the ante, by hiring White street gang members to attack Black scabs. The gangbangers took the Teamsters Union’s money, but they weren’t at all particular about which African Americans they attacked – they launched a generalized race war against Chicago’s entire African American community. 20 African Americans (none of whom were scabs at Montgomery Ward) were murdered and over 450 were injured. Some were victims of the White gangbangers, others were attacked by the Chicago Police, who intervened on the gang member’s side when Black Chicagoans tried to defend themselves against their terrorist attackers. And every Black Chicagoan learned to hate AFofL unions in general and the Teamsters Union in particular– a sentiment that would last for many years. In the end, the Teamsters were defeated – and the Black scabs were fired and replaced by the White strikers, who had to quit the union to get their jobs back. And Con Shea was indicted for crimes that would now be called labor racketeering – but, racketeering as such wasn’t illegal at that time (the first state racketeering law wouldn’t be passed until 1930 – and that was a New York State law, not valid in Illinois - and the federal anti racketeering law wouldn’t be passed until 1971) so Con’s lawyers were able to beat the case – but he did lose his job as head of the IBT. The Teamsters Union underwent a split as a result of the Montgomery Ward disaster – it would take a decade to reunite most of the locals, but one Chicago Teamsters union, the Chicago Truck Drivers Union, stayed outside of the IBT’s ranks for the next 95 years, not coming back to the Teamsters until 2000. And the IBT got a new general president, one Daniel J.

Tobin, who would run the union for the next 48 years. Tobin backed out of local governance – he let the locals and “joint councils” (bodies that represented all of the Teamsters Union locals in a state or region) do whatever they wanted, as long as they paid their per capita taxes to the IBT general office in Indianapolis on a timely fashion and didn’t tread on the toes of other IBT locals. This basically let the gangsters in Chicago, Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, New Jersey, Detroit, Cleveland and Youngstown do whatever they wanted in the Teamsters locals they ran, as long as they didn’t interfere with other gangster run unions, or with the non mobbed up IBT locals in other areas. Tobin also made it very difficult for Teamsters locals to go on sanctioned strikes.

He required that IBT locals get 2/3rds majority votes to even call a strike and even then they had to get his official permission or they wouldn’t get a penny from the general office of the IBT – nor would they be allowed to ask other locals or joint councils for strike assistance. Tobin, a former butter and egg wagon team driver from Boston, also abandoned warehouse worker and loading dockworker organizing.

He regarded those unskilled workers as “trash” (yes, he actually called them that…in print…in the pages of the International Teamster, the union’s official magazine!) who didn’t deserve to be in a skilled horse drawn wagon drivers union like the Teamsters. Dan Tobin’s horse and buggy unionism was soon in for a big challenge – something called Prohibition. A motley coalition of conservative Republicans, racist Southern Democrats, anti alcoholism campaigners, fundamentalist Christians, anti immigrant bigots and the Ku Klux Klan had gotten the US Constitution amended in 1918 to prohibit the sale and transportation of alcohol across state lines. This immediately made 6 major American industries (brewing, distilling, beer wholesaling, liquor distributing, liquor stores and bars) into criminal enterprises. Those industries all happened to be heavily unionized – which made Prohibition a disaster for the American Federation of Labor in general, and specifically for the United Brewery Workers Union, Distillery Workers International Union, Hotel and Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union…and for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, who’s members delivered wine, liquor and beer to bars, restaurants and liquor stores. It was great for organized crime – legitimate business owners who wanted to stay in these now illegal industries needed protection from law enforcement (and from the criminal underworld, who now had free reign to victimize these newly criminalized business owners, who were no longer able to call the cops). Some alcohol industry related business owners sold their businesses outright to the mobsters – some were willing to be brought out of their now illegal businesses, while others were forced out of their companies at gunpoint. It’s safe to say that Prohibition gave birth to modern American organized crime. Gangsters had been transitioning from street crime to racketeering for a number of years – particularly in the construction, sea freight, wholesaling and local drayage industries – but Prohibition took things to a whole other level. Prohibition also gave birth to a whole new industry – over the road motor freight hauling. Railroads had dominated intercity shipping for most of the previous 80 years – but they were useless to “bootleggers” (gangsters who smuggled illegal booze) because railroads had been endowed with police powers by 19th century state legislators. Almost all railroads had their own in-house police departments, and therefore they would not transport illegal cargo (and were likely to arrest anybody who tried to get them to do so). However, bootleggers could hire a trucking company, or an independent driver with their own truck, or buy or rent their own truck, and haul their illegal liquor at will. Trucks had been around since the 1890’s, but, thanks to War Department inspired technological innovations (windshields, enclosed driver cabins, pneumatic tires, the shock absorber, the key controlled ignition ect) designed during World War I, they had finally become competitive with the horse drawn wagon. Also, while it took tens of millions of dollars to start up a railroad (which closed that industry to all but the wealthiest Wall Street billionaires) just about anybody with a few thousand dollars could buy a truck on credit from Ford, Mack, Diamond Reo, White Motors, GMC or Freightliner and set up a trucking company. Trucks also required a hell of a lot less care than horses – even the poorly built motor trucks of the day really didn’t need that much maintenance work done, and unlike horses they didn’t require daily exercise, monthly horseshoe repair work or periodic visits to the veterinarian! The cost savings from abandoning horse power for diesel power greatly lowered the barriers to entry to the road freight industry. Lots of drayage firms – and individual teamsters with an entrepreneurial streak – tried their hands at motor freight…as did some of the bootleggers. In that era of a lightly patrolled Canadian border (booze was still perfectly legal up there) and small, weak and underfunded state police departments, liquor smuggling was easy. The only hard part was the occasional hijacking attempt by rival gangsters, and a Colt .45 tucked in the driver’s waistband and/or a sawed off 12 gauge under the driver’s seat and/or a gangster in the passenger seat with a Thompson submachine gun generally solved that problem. Overnight, a whole new industry sprung up – and began to compete successfully with the railroads for long distance freight.

Because nobody had a monopoly, rates were low, they were far more attentive to customer service (a far cry from the “the public be damned” arrogance of the railroad barons) and they were far more able to provide flexible service, because the trucking companies could go anywhere that had roads, instead of only being able to serve places that had train stations. This could have, and should have, been a golden opportunity for organizing for the IBT. It wasn’t. Dan Tobin, still a horse and buggy man at heart, said that over the road drivers, like warehouse helpers and loading dock workers, were “trash” who didn’t belong in the Teamsters Union. Perhaps Tobin had other motives here too – maybe he wanted to avoid antagonizing the gangsters who’s liquor was being hauled on those trucks? After all, the wiseguys controlled most of the union’s bigger locals – Tobin only stayed in office because those local’s officers voted for him at the international convention every five years – he couldn’t afford to upset those hoodlums by trying to unionize the men who carried their illegal alcohol! And Tobin could have lost more than his job – in Chicago, the more aggressive of these bootleggers (in particular, a brash young florist shop owner from Brooklyn named Alfonse Capone) had been known to beat and even murder union officials who defied the will of organized crime. In any case the IBT as an international union did nothing to organize the over the road truckers. The only locals that did anything about road freight drivers were the general drivers locals in New York City and Chicago. On paper, those locals represented drivers for “common carriers” – freight companies that hauled all kinds of goods, rather than just specific products for specific industries. The over the road freight industry fell in their jurisdiction, so they were the logical local unions to organize that teamster craft. But it wasn’t that simple. Problem was, the guys who ran locals 707 and 807 in New York and locals 705 and 710 in Chicago were labor racketeers, rather than committed unionists. And their idea of “organizing” was nothing more than cold blunt extortion. They would send “organizers” [that is to say, thugs and hitmen who were on the union payroll] to meet out of town drivers at the city line, where they would force those drivers to join the union or they wouldn’t be allowed to drive into the city to deliver their freight. The Teamster locals who these workers were forced to join wouldn’t bargain for those drivers, or in any way protect them from on the job abuse – they just shook those drivers down for union dues, more or less at gunpoint. This brutal “organizing” tactic not only failed to unionize the road freight industry it also alienated the drivers from the IBT, because it made the Teamsters Union look like nothing more than a shakedown scam designed to rob truck drivers (which, in a real way, it basically was). But Tobin and the other Teamsters leaders didn’t care about those guys. The union’s bread and butter was drayage (an archaic horse and buggy era term for local delivery) …soda, bread, fresh fish, meat, wholesale grocery products, coal, ice, moving vans – and, above all, the big cash cow, building materials delivery. The construction teamsters were the core of the union – and their industry, with it’s time sensitive deadlines and marginal profit margins for the contractors, created many opportunities for theft, graft, extortion, bid rigging, and various other kinds of criminal activity. The building materials teamster locals were the most gangster ridden, the most openly corrupt – and the ones who’s leaders had most abandoned just about every moral principle of unionism in exchange for cold hard cash. They also represented workers who made up the core of the union’s membership, and consequently those locals were the financial backbone of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as an institution. This all worked very well (at least for the IBT, it’s leaders and the gangsters they worked so closely with) until the Great Depression hit. The depression caused construction activity to come to an almost complete halt – a disaster for the building materials teamsters who were the heart of the union. Consumer goods sales fell sharply – including even staple goods like bread, milk, butter and eggs – which caused a lot of job loss for many local drivers. Union membership began to drop rapidly – with a slight lag, since IBT bylaws let members go 6 months without dues payment before suspension, and it took another 6 months of non payment for them to be expelled. The early 1930’s were years of misery for all American workers – and teamsters suffered along with the rest of the class.

For many of the better off drivers, the crash of 1929 led to a sharp fall in income - from middle class to near poverty – almost overnight. Dan Tobin enthusiastically supported Democratic presidential candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, in part because the Democrats had promised the AFofL that they would repeal Prohibition if elected (relegalizing booze was a major part of the AFofL’s economic recovery program). As promised FDR did indeed lean on Congress and the states to repeal Prohibition. Unfortunately, that move didn’t create any new jobs – it just legalized already existing illegal jobs, and ended persecution of alcohol industry workers. For a lot of the bartenders, brewery workers, distillery workers and beer truck drivers who’s jobs were suddenly legalized found that they had a sudden drop in income. They’d commanded top dollar back when their jobs held the risk of getting arrested or shot – but now that their jobs were legal, their bosses cut their pay very sharply. Another part of FDR’s economic recovery program did actually help the unions. Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act repealed the anti trust laws, and let employers associations conspire with the big companies in a particular industry to drive their smaller and weaker competitors out of business. The NIRA also required that these employers associations impose Labor Codes for each industry that would be binding on all their member firms – and that these associations agree to bargain with labor unions in their industries. That latter clause - NIRA Section 7(a) – a rule intended to legalize company unions – instead encouraged hundreds of thousands of workers to join the AFofL unions, or to build completely new unions from scratch. Among those workers flooding into the labor movement was a very young dock worker at Kroger’s grocery warehouse in Detroit, the son of a single mom who migrated from Southern Indiana to Michigan, a kid named James Riddle Hoffa. Hoffa and some of the other teenagers on the loading dock at Kroger’s built their own union, called a strike, got Kroger’s to bargain with them and were persuaded to affiliate their small union with the Teamsters. Their union became Teamsters local 337, which still exists to this very day and still represents supermarket warehouse workers in Southeastern Michigan. Hoffa so impressed the leaders of IBT Joint Council # 43 in Detroit that they hired him as an organizer – he was put on the payroll of another Teamsters local, Detroit General Drivers local 299, given a Cadillac and was sent out on the road to sign up carhaulers, the over the road truck drivers who delivered new cars from the auto plants to the dealerships. Along with the legions of workers rushing into the unions, many communist labor activists came along too – in many cases coming back to unions that had expelled them for political reasons during the 1920’s. The Teamsters was no exception here. In particular, in Minneapolis, a number of Marxist radical coal delivery drivers entered the IBT’s ranks in 1933. They were members of the Socialist Workers Party, a group of former Communist Party, USA members who’d left that group because the CPUSA supported Soviet leader Josef Stalin while the SWP supported exiled dissident Soviet communist Leon Trotsky (similar splits happened in every Communist Party in the world – in the USSR itself, Trotsky’s supporters were jailed – and in many cases shot – by Soviet police for their political beliefs). It wasn’t that surprising that the Minneapolis Teamsters Union was a hotbed of such radicalism – Minnesota’s working class had a long left wing history dating back to before World War I. At the onset of the depression, the state Farmer Labor Party had succeeded in electing one of it’s members as mayor of Minneapolis and another as governor of Minnesota. Most of the Trotskyist teamsters in Minneapolis were coal or ice truck drivers, and they aggressively encouraged their coworkers to join the Teamsters. The IBT was more than willing to accept the new members – after all, everywhere else in the country the union was shrinking rapidly due to mass unemployment in the local delivery business. The next year, 1934, the economy picked up – in large part due to Roosevelt’s government spending programs – and union activism picked up too. Many workers really believed FDR and the Democratic Party when they claimed to be on the side of the working man. In Minneapolis, those Trotskyist coal drivers reenergized the small teamster local they joined, and launched a strike that quickly organized all of the coal and ice delivery drivers in the city. That was a jumping off point for an organizing campaign that summer, which signed up just about every truck driver in the city – and many of the warehouse workers and dockworkers as well. This triggered a strike in July 1934 that rapidly evolved from a narrow truck drivers strike into a broad, working class-wide insurrection against the capitalist class of Minnesota. At one point, the militant Minneapolis truckers, and their allies from the building trades and from the city’s unemployed – who had built their own army to fight the Minneapolis PD, the local sheriffs department and a private militia of rich men and upscale students from the University of Minnesota – were prepared to take on the Minneapolis Police in the streets, guns in hand (this was in the wake of the murder of several strikers by the cops). The Trotskyist Teamster leaders, who had long preached revolution, got cold feet when they found themselves in the frightening position of actually leading one! So, those erstwhile revolutionaries, terrified to be actually leading a revolution, did their level best to ratchet the working class-wide revolt back down to a regular craft union labor strike - and actively fought to prevent workers from other trades - and even other teamsters from other cities in Minnesota and North Dakota from joining in the strike. Dan Tobin was alarmed that the joint council in the Twin Cities had been taken over by Trotskyists. So he reached out to his friends in the Chicago Outfit (Al Capone’s Midwestern branch of the Italian American crime syndicate known as cosa nostra - “this thing of ours”) who sent up a crew of hitmen and thugs – along with some legitimate union organizers (including Jimmy Hoffa). After a brief terror campaign by the wiseguys against the radicals and the workers who supported them, Farrell Dobbs, the leader of the Minnesota Trotskyists, came to a truce with Dan Tobin and the Chicago wiseguys. They would help the gangsters with new organizing in the locals they controlled in Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and other parts of the Midwest (and would in no way challenge them politically in their local unions – or Dan Tobin in the international) and in return, the wiseguys would stop their war against the reds in Minnesota and would lend the Trotskyists some of their musclemen to aid their organizing drives. Thus began a bizarre 5 year unlikely coalition between Leon Trotsky’s American followers and Al Capone’s gunmen that succeeded in unionizing the freight industry in the Midwest. The Trotskyists in Minneapolis - and their allies in Fargo, North Dakota and in Omaha, Nebraska - and the wiseguys in Detroit and Chicago launched an areawide organizing campaign. The reds and the goodfellas built a new type of teamster intermediate body – the area conference, to unify all the locals and joint councils in that vast area. The wiseguys even let one of the Minnesota Trotskyists – one Farrell Dobbs, a former Republican telephone company engineer who became a coal wagon driver and a Trotskyist because of the depression – run this new union body. Building off of the existing IBT base in local delivery, the leaders of the North Central District Drivers Council organized the local terminals of over the road freight carriers across the Midwest. Once organized, the dockworkers in local freight terminals would refuse to unload trucks with non union drivers.

This compelled freight carriers to unionize drivers from their other terminals – who, in turn, would demand that the non union dock workers in those terminals be unionized. Omaha carriers put up the most resistance – so leftist Teamster locals in the Twin Cities, Des Moines and Fargo, and mobbed up Teamster locals in St Louis, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Chicago and Detroit organized a boycott – union drivers from those cities refused to drive to Nebraska, and terminal workers in those towns would not unload freight inbound from Omaha. This forced the Nebraska carriers to sign with the union. The odd goodfella-radical alliance worked – for a while… The Trotskyists in Minnesota, the Dakotas, Iowa and Nebraska built their unions based on rank and file activism and a strong shop steward system in the terminals. The wiseguys in Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, St Louis, Kansas City and Cleveland organized “the old fashioned way”. They relied on full time paid organizers, many of whom were career criminals or professional boxers rather than sincere labor activists. These wiseguy “organizers” would sign up members (often by coercive “lead pipe” methods) and organizing carriers with the enticement of dealing with a pro business union – balanced out with the threat of beatings and firebombings for those carriers who chose to be uncooperative. The Chicago freight locals had long been accustomed to this type of organizing – they had a long tradition of using thugs to stop trucks on the outskirts of the city and forcing them to join the union. The only difference was now, the newly unionized drivers were actually getting real union representation, instead of just a shakedown. Organizers in Michigan and Ohio used similar tactics to unionize the carhaulers, steelhaulers and coal truck drivers who hauled the products of American industry crosscountry. The grocery industry was organized the same way – chains like Kroger had their delivery drivers and warehouse workers organized by the Teamsters, who would then refuse to deliver to the stores unless the butchers were organized into the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen and the cashiers, stock clerks and other workers were signed up into the Retail Clerks International Association. In many areas, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and the Retail Clerks had to create new local unions to take in all the new members. Many of these locals were virtual satellites of Teamsters warehouse worker locals – often literally run by the same people and operating out of the same offices. Meanwhile, at the same time on the West Coast, another group of radicals were organizing in the freight industry – and the business unionists of that area had to come up with a response as well. A group of merchant seamen and longshoremen, members of the pro Josef Stalin Communist Party, USA, had launched a coast-wide maritime workers strike in California, Oregon and Washington State. The strike was centered in San Francisco – and at the exact same time as the red Minnesota Teamsters were on strike, the radical longshoremen of the Bay Area called an areawide general strike (which, among other unions, also included the Teamsters who hauled sea freight to and from the piers). There was actually a third Marxist-led general strike going on at the exact same time as the Minneapolis and San Francisco walkouts– a strike that started in the Auto Lite plant in Toledo, Ohio but soon spread to every worker and unemployed person in that city.

That was led by the American Workers Party – which soon merged with the Socialist Workers Party that had led the strike in Minnesota. Those were radical times in America – as well as the rest of the world - workers were revolting in Austria, Spain and France at the same time as those 3 general strikes were in progress in America. It’s very possible that if those socialists and communists leading those strikes had not channeled the workers they led into pro Democratic Party unions, there might very well have been a revolution here. In any case, the conservative Teamster business agents who ran the IBT locals in the West Coast ports found themselves suddenly forced to organize their jurisdiction by the communist led sailors and longshoremen. Dan Tobin – very uncomfortable and frankly terrified by what had happened in Minneapolis – needed a stable, conservative business unionist to control the West Coast teamsters that were flooding into the union. He picked one Dave Beck for that responsibility – and put him in charge of what came to be known as the Western Conference of Teamsters, an areawide body like the NCDDC that unified all the Teamster locals and joint councils in the Pacific and Intermountain Western states. Beck was the son of a single mom who worked in a commercial laundry.

His mother got him a job as a laundry wagon driver when he came home from the Navy after World War I. Beck’s first involvement with the Teamsters Union was his organizing of unionized laundry wagon drivers to scab on the Seattle general strike of 1919. That reactionary start was the beginning of a long career as a right wing business unionist, who desperately wanted to be liked by the bosses he bargained with and who had nothing but sneering contempt for the “pot and bottle washers” (that’s what he actually called his members – in a public statement Quote: d in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer!) who he nominally represented. Beck, lacking the easy access to cosa nostra thugs that his East Coast and Midwest Teamster officer counterparts had, ended up having to organize an army of hitmen and leg breakers of his own. A newspaper in Grays Harbor, Washington State, compared Beck’s hoodlums to the bizarre, musclebound and obnoxious “Alice the Goon” character in the Popeye the Sailor cartoon – and the name stuck….Beck’s thugs came to be known as the “Goon Squad”. Beck’s goons – and his legitimate organizers – signed up truck drivers all over the western states (and Beck immediately stripped them of their democratic rights by placing their locals in trusteeships, run by flunkies personally appointed by him instead of elected officers). In the East, the cosa nostra gangsters (and their Irish and Jewish allies) who ran the Teamster locals also got heavily into organizing – very much in the Chicago fashion, stopping drivers on the road and making them sign up (and compelling the new members to refuse to let their trucks be unloaded non union, thus forcing the freight lines to sign up – with, of course, the promise that the IBT would be reasonable with the bosses, and the threat that the union’s gorillas would come back at night with firebombs if the bosses didn’t sign up with the IBT). Teamsters local 807, the Manhattan/Bronx general drivers local, used to have it’s organizers patrol the New Jersey approaches to the George Washington Bridge, the main road freight route into New York City from points west, where they would intercept non union truckers and force them to join the union on the spot to enter the city. In the East and the West, a whole bunch of local agreements were signed, with wages, mileage rates, seniority rules and conditions all over the map – and in many cases, carriers with cosa nostra ties – or those willing to pay bribes – got special sweetheart deals with the IBT. In the Midwest, the Trotskyists persuaded their cosa nostra allies to allow one multi state union contract to be negotiated. The Central States agreement set an hourly wage for dockworkers and other freight barn workers – and for non-driving work and local deliveries done by drivers, and set a mileage rate for drivers when they were on the highway. The agreement also set up seniority rules – basically so there would be a fair way of dividing up work opportunities between freight workers. The Central States Freight Agreement was a giant step forward for freight workers. This was a giant concession on the part of the carriers – but they really didn’t have much of a choice. With the massive wave of unionization that swept American industry, like many bosses, it wasn’t a question of being union, but of which union they’d have to deal with. By the mid 1930’s, many of the AFofL’s manufacturing and transport workers unions had seceded into a body known as the Congress of Industrial Organization. Many of these CIO unions were run by members of the Communist Party, USA – and even the ones that weren’t were pushed to militancy by the ones that were. In the road transportation industry, the CIO’s communist led Transport Workers Union was something of a threat to the IBT. It was primarily a New York City subway workers union, but there was TWU local 206, a communist led all Black TWU truckers local on the New Orleans waterfront (those port truckers were sick of being jim crowed in the segregated Teamsters local they’d been in since 1892, so they gave the CIO a try). The CIO’s Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (like the TWU also a communist led New York City based union) was a major threat to the IBT in the warehouse industry – with RWDSU local 65 directly competing with the various New York Teamster warehouse worker locals for members. It didn’t help the IBT’s cause that RWDSU local 65 was militant, democratic, non racist and totally devoid of gangsterism – everything that Teamsters Joint Council # 16 (the IBT’s New York City and Long Island council) was not. The International Longshoremens and Warehousemen’s Union, the former Pacific Coast District of the AFofL’s International Longshoremen’s Association (until the communist led district seceded from the New York Irish gangster-run international union in 1938) had a coast-wide warehouse worker organizing drive (known by the rather militaristic name of “The March Inland”) that was also a major threat to the IBT’s warehouse jurisdiction. Dave Beck’s Western Conference of Teamsters had to put up with the ILWU on the docks – but, Beck attacked the CIO from the back door, by sending his goon squad to help the AFofL’s United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America wage a full scale war on the CIO’s International Woodworkers of America, a communist led lumberjacks and sawmill workers union that had seceded from the UBCJA. The big sawmills of Seattle and Portland, and lumber towns all over Washington State, Oregon and Northern California were terrorized by Beck’s goons, who tried to baseball bat pro IWA woodworkers back into the UBCJA. Beck even sent his goons across the border into British Columbia, Canada (with the blessings of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) to attack the radical wood workers union there. And, all over the country, Teamsters building materials locals ordered their lumber yard members to refuse to handle or deliver lumber with the IWA-CIO union label, and to demand their bosses only stock wood carrying the UBCJA-AFofL label. This was an extreme case – but nationally, the IBT was on the front lines of the AFofL’s battle against the CIO. Basically, the wiseguys presented the IBT as a responsible, conservative, racist and pro capitalist AFofL business union, as opposed to the communist, integrationist, militant and radical CIO class struggle-oriented unions. The Trotskyists had their own reasons for sticking with the American Federation of Labor – they hated the CIO because it had such strong ties to the CPUSA, their pro-Stalin enemies, so the SWP championed the AFofL, despite it’s open gangsterism, in-your-face racism and pro employer approach to unionism. The Trotskyist-led North Central District Drivers Council even helped the AFofL’s International Association of Machinists and Aircraft Workers defeat a revolt of Minneapolis iron foundry and machine shop workers who wanted to quit the IAM and join the CIO’s communist led United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. It didn’t even matter to these socialists that the IAM was the most reactionary and openly racist union in the AFofL and the UE was the most radical and militant union in the CIO – nor did the desire of those ironworkers and machinists to quit the AFofL and join the CIO matter either! The Teamsters became the fastest growing AFofL affiliate – ballooning from barely 75,000 members in 1934 to over 400,000 by 1939. The core of these workers was still the local delivery drivers who’d always been the IBT’s bread and butter – but now freight workers and other over the road truckers made up a large proportion of the membership, and grocery warehouse workers were a major component of IBT membership as well. The Teamsters also had lots of “general” workers – non freight related members, mostly workers in small factories who’s owners had no choice but to sign a contract with a union, but who would rather have the Teamsters than a CIO union. Some of these “industrial teamsters” worked in the food processing industry, where the IBT had long had a presence – dairy workers, soda bottling plant workers, fruit and vegetable packing shed hands, frozen food workers ect. Others were employed in random factories where the boss, facing a pro CIO workforce, brought in the IBT as a “respectable” alternative. This is also how the Teamsters got their first civil service members. The workers at the New York City Department of Sanitation wanted to join District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, CIO. But the city’s pro New Deal Liberal Republican mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, would not allow them join a CIO union with close ties to the communists and radical Irish nationalist exiles who ran Transport Workers Union local 100. He would let them join a respectable pro capitalist AFofL union though. So, the Teamsters set up local 883, the Uniformed Sanitationmen’s Association, and the Department of Sanitation recognized that union, instead of DC 37, the union the sanitationmen actually wanted! By the end of the 1930’s, the Teamsters was, after the United Mine Workers, the biggest union in the nation. Dan Tobin and the joint council and local leaders were very happy at what they’d built – and the local Teamster officers had found that they could coordinate their locals and still have autonomy to run their individual units as they saw fit. There was only one problem – Farrell Dobbs and his Trotskyists. They had turned their backs on their fellow radicals in the CPUSA, and had fought hard against the CIO, but they were still revolutionaries, and that just would not do. Especially since the new area conferences created an obvious power base for taking over Dan Tobin’s job. Tobin could see having a conservative business unionist like Dave Beck as his successor someday. But not Farrell Dobbs! Tobin had tried very hard to convince Dobbs to abandon his socialist politics and become a respectable pro corporate business unionist. When it was clear that this was not going to happen, Tobin expelled all of the Trotskyist union leaders from the posts they held in the North Central District Drivers Council and in locals in Minnesota, the Dakotas, Iowa and Nebraska. The teamsters in Minneapolis, St Paul, Fargo, Sioux Falls, Des Moines and Omaha did not like seeing their leaders being abused like that – and, had they been asked to do so by Dobbs and his comrades, they would have left the Teamsters as a block and gone to the CIO. But Dobbs did the “responsible” thing – he refused to call any strikes or job actions against Tobin and delayed calling for disaffiliation until it was way too late. By the time Dobbs group tried to join the CIO, their members had been baseball batted by goons from Chicago and Detroit into joining newly chartered Teamster locals that were run by wiseguys and thugs. Even when they went in the CIO, the Trotskyists didn’t affiliate with the CIO Transport Workers Union, that federation’s road transportation union (mainly because the TWU was run by the Trotskyists’ arch enemies, the CPUSA). And they might have had their reasons – after all, Josef Stalin, the CPUSA’s Russian political mentor, had just had his secret agents assassinate the SWP’s Russian political mentor, Leon Trotsky (who was living in exile in Mexico). So there was more than a little bit of bad blood between the two groups. Instead, the Minneapolis Trotskyist Teamsters hooked up with the CIO’s United Construction Workers Organizing Committee. The UCWOC was a small right wing low wage construction union run by one A.D.

Lewis, the brother of John L.

Lewis, the very well known president of the United Mine Workers of America (he was a labor celebrity of the day, frequently Quote: d in the newspapers, on the radio and in the newsreels and by far the best known union officer in America at the time). A.D Lewis’ union was run a whole lot like the more gangster-ridden Teamster locals were – they used goons and thugs to force construction workers to join, and then approached their bosses with promises of a compliant union with substandard pay scales and weak sweetheart contracts. The brief marriage between the Trotskyists and the CIO thugs ended quickly, and Dobbs group ended up disbanding. UCWOC disbanded too – with A.D.

Lewis going to work for his niece, John L’s daughter Katherine, the head of another low wage gangster union, United Mine Workers of America District 50 (which was set up by her dad to sign low wage sweetheart contracts with sweatshops in big cities outside of the coalfields) Dobbs was replaced as head of the North Central District Drivers Council by that hardcore teenage loading dock militant from Detroit, who had grown up into a tough young organizer and a responsible business unionist, Jimmy Hoffa. Hoffa immediately changed the NCDDC’s name to Central States Conference of Teamsters. Within a year, Dobbs and a dozen of his Socialist Workers Party comrades would be under federal indictment for their politics and their opposition to US participation in World War II.

Most of them did jail time, one got deported to Sweden and two of them killed themselves rather than go to prison. Now, Tobin’s position was secure – no matter who succeeded him, Beck or Hoffa, the IBT presidency would go to a respectable conservative business unionist. The AFofL as a whole had greatly prospered during the 1930’s Most of the several million workers who had flooded the ranks of the unions in that tumultuous decade had ended up being organized into AFofL affiliates – often with the active intervention of their bosses against the CIO and in favor of the AFofL. With the exception of the UMWA, the Teamsters had prospered most out of all the AFofL affiliates. The other AFofL unions only signed up workers who had some connection with the union’s core jurisdictions, which limited their membership growth. The Teamsters Union leadership would organize anybody, no matter how little their job had to do with trucking and warehousing. As late as 1934 the IBT was a union of local delivery wagon and truck drivers and their helpers, that was really strict about keeping non road freight-related workers out of the union. By the end of the decade, the IBT was a ‘conglomerate union’ representing workers in all segments of trucking, from local to cross county, from common carriers that hauled all kinds of cargo to rigs that only hauled one particular type of freight for only one client. The union had also become the dominant warehouse workers union in the nation And the Teamsters also had lots of members who had absolutely nothing to do with trucking at all – including lots of workers who’s bosses had brought in the IBT as the least worse alternative to a CIO union. The IBT was now the second largest union in the American Federation of Labor – second only to the United Mine Workers of America, which had grown to 600,000 members by following a Teamster-like path of organizing lots of workers who had absolutely nothing to do with coal mining, and specifically marketing their union’s low wage District 50 to bosses who faced CIO organizing drives and wanted a right wing pro boss union as an alternative. World War II greatly calmed the militancy of the official labor movement. It didn’t stop struggles on the jobsites, but increasingly unions helped corporations and the feds break wildcat strikes and identify strike leaders for firing, blacklisting and, in many cases, drafting into the Army. The CIO had become increasingly more conservative and AFofL-like, and the right wing CIO leaders began aggressively purging communists from their unions, just as Dan Tobin had expelled Trotskyists from his at the beginning of the decade. The CIO went even further than the AFofL, and actually pledged to not go on strike for the duration of the war, no matter what the bosses did – with the promise that if workers did go on strike on a wildcat basis, the CIO unions would break the strikes on behalf of the bosses and the government (a promise the CIO unions kept). This collapse of union militancy stalled union growth - except for the increase in factory worker union membership – which was entirely caused by increasing war orders and the extra hiring that had to be done to produce the massive amount of military materiel necessary for the war. The Teamsters had another major growth spurt in the 1950’s, on the trucking side because of major changes in American industry and society, and on the non truck side thanks to the union’s willingness to sign sweetheart contracts. Large suburbs had been built on the outskirts of America’s cities, to house the country’s growing working class (or at least it’s White segment). New types of commercial development emerged to serve the needs of those communities – the supermarket and the shopping mall. The trucking and warehousing industries rapidly expanded to service all these new far flung stores. Also, the trucking industry, thanks to it’s flexibility, it’s lower labor costs, and the willingness of emerging road freight carriers to charge low rates to get new business, was rapidly taking market share away from the railroads. The railroads- who had been the main transporters of interstate freight from the 1830’s until WW II - lost most of their business to the trucking fleets. Having had a monopoly for so long, the railroads had failed to modernize their businesses, on the assumption that they would always be top dogs in the freight business, so why reinvest their profits in improving their businesses, when they could just pocket the money – or put it into more profitable investments, like real estate in the downtown areas of big cities? Also, the railroads had much higher labor costs than the trucking companies – and, thanks to their monopoly, no real reason to reduce them, when it was so much easier to just buy labor peace from the 15 railroad unions. The railroads unions and the carriers had maintained the same workrules for almost 30 years – 1 locomotive engineer to drive the train, 2 locomotive firemen to shovel coal into the firebox (even on diesel electric locomotives that didn’t have a firebox or any coal) and 2 brakemen and 1 conductor in the caboose. And those 6 guys (who were in 4 different unions) got paid a days wages for every 100 miles the train ran down the track (even if it took way less than 8 hours to go that 100 miles). And all of those labor costs got passed directly on to the shippers in the form of high freight rates. The trucking companies only had one union – the Teamsters – for all their workers, on the truck and on the loading dock, and the Teamsters Union had already proved to be very compliant when it came to labor cost control. The railroads nearly died in the 1950’s – it would take another 40 years for them to be able to compete with the trucking business. The road freight industry picked up the slack – by the end of the decade, most US freight was hauled by truck (and that is still the case to this very day). The non trucking side of the IBT prospered too – for somewhat more nefarious reasons. Labor racketeers like New York City’s John “Johnny Dio” Dioguardi, Anthony “Tony Ducks” Corallo, Anthony “Gaspipe” Casso, Bernard Adelstein and Matthew “Matty the Horse” Ianello (he is said to have gotten his nickname from the two horses heads on the Teamsters logo), Chicago’s “Red” Dorfman and his son Alan, Cleveland’s Bill Presser and his son Jackie and New Jersey’s Provenzano brothers signed sweetheart contracts with low wage sweatshops in various industries, putting a union seal of approval on their abusive conditions, and enabling those low wage bosses to keep out legitimate unions. Johnny Dio, Bernard Adelstein and Red Dorfman also engaged in various types of insurance fraud, using the Teamster benefits funds for the enrichment of themselves and the bosses of the crime families they were affiliated with. William Presser, a businessman who had never been an actual union member until he became an IBT official, simultaneously ran the employers association and the Teamsters Union local in the Cleveland candy and cigarette wholesaling industry. His son, Jackie Presser, a very energetic labor racketeer, simultaneously ran the employers association and the Teamsters local in the jukebox sales and service industry, simultaneously ran the local bartenders union and owned a unionized bar, also had a sideline in arson for hire (specializing in firebombing corrupt businesses who didn’t make their payoffs on time) and he dabbled in extortion, loansharking, running a supermarket clerks union and a laundry workers union in his spare time. Basically, Presser the younger was a walking talking violation of the National Labor Relations Act. In New Jersey, Joint Council # 70 and it’s largest affiliate, local 560, were run by the Provenzanos – Anthony (“Tony Pro”), his brother Salvatore (“Sammy Pro”) and his other brother Nunzio (who didn’t have a nickname), all of whom were members of the Genovese family of cosa nostra (Tony Pro was a captain, who ran the family’s North Jersey crew – Sammy Pro and Nunzio were soldiers in that crew). The Pro’s specialized in selling sweetheart contracts to freight carriers and grocery warehouses in Northern New Jersey, with wages, benefits and working conditions inferior to national or regional agreements. If a carrier or warehouse paid enough to the brothers Provenzano, they could go completely non union. And any teamster who dared disagree would get hurt. Like dissident truck driver George Phillips. He was attacked by baseball bat wielding thugs on his delivery route – in broad daylight in front of witnesses - for daring to challenge the Provenzanos in a union election. Or they might even get killed Like local 560’s Secretary Treasurer, Anthony Castellito. He was a long time supporter of the Provenzanos who mysteriously “disappeared” – and was presumed to have been murdered - because the Provenzanos feared he would testify against them. Or Walter Glockner, a shop steward at Dorn Trucking Co., a firm that was paying the Pros $ 1,500 a week in tribute. He was shot in the back 3 times in front of his own home – and the only eyewitness to the murder mysteriously “disappeared” before he could testify, never to be seen again. With leaders like these, the Teamsters Union was well on it’s way to becoming the largest union in America (1.4 million members – one out of every 10 union members in the country was a Teamster)…and the most blatantly corrupt. Which didn’t bother the employers in their industries one little bit. The labor racketeers didn’t ask for much – the cosa nostra standard 2% “tribute” in most cases – they would keep the workers in line, and by and large they were men of their word who kept their promises to the bosses. The IBT’s corruption was actually a stabilizing force in the trucking industry. Trucking was filled with small marginal businesses, and even more marginal independent “gypsy” truckers, each one trying their damnedest to get as much freight as possible. This meant that the big freight carriers always had to worry about some random guy with a truck coming along and taking their freight by undercutting their prices. There were federal regulations on freight rates and routes - but the Interstate Commerce Commission was weak and underfunded, so those could be easily evaded. The Teamsters Union, by contrast, was far less easily defied – ESPECIALLY the more openly gangster-dominated Teamster locals. The IBT guaranteed a sort of stability to the larger carriers – they put a floor under labor costs, aggressively enforced labor standards on the more marginal firms that might otherwise try and undercharge the big carriers and in general did their best to limit competition between carriers. This created a huge problem for the Fortune 500 companies who’s freight was hauled by these carriers. The big capitalists wanted and needed competition in freight rates to bring their costs down – a freight monopoly hurt their bottom line. The big corporations approached the federal government – and since they were far higher up on the capitalist class food chain than even the biggest trucking company, their concerns were listened to. The feds were limited in what they could do – racketeering wasn’t even a federal crime at that time (and wouldn’t be until the passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1971). But the government did try and go after the Teamsters. Teamsters General President Dan Tobin was planning to retire in 1952, after almost a half century in office, and he had designated Western Conference Chairman Dave Beck as his successor. Beck wasn’t as openly corrupt as the Eastern and Midwestern Teamster leaders were – but he had become a millionaire thanks to his union posts, and a lot of that income was less than 100% legitimate. The feds also had a psychological advantage with Beck – he had grown up very poor, in a single parent household (at a time when that was considered to be very shameful in this country) so he desperately wanted to be liked and accepted by upper class people in his native Seattle, as a way of validating himself. So, the feds indicted Beck in a very high profile way on some relatively minor tax violations the very day that he was appointed Teamsters general president in 1952. Beck, utterly humiliated on the very day that should have been the greatest triumph in his life, spent his entire 5 year term of office dodging subpoenas and grand juries, at one point literally getting on a boat and fleeing to Europe, another time escaping to the Bahamas and claming he was too sick to come back to America, before he finally went to prison in 1957. Beck’s successor as general president, Jimmy Hoffa, faced similar criminal justice issues from the day he was appointed to office – but he was much better equipped mentally to handle the challenge. Hoffa didn’t dodge subpoenas – far from it, he’d show up and openly defy his prosecutors (even when he was hauled before the US Senate, he didn’t hide his contempt for the feds – in particular young congressional attorney Robert F.

Kennedy, the architect of the federal campaign against the Teamsters). Even when the feds got the recently merged American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations to challenge the Teamsters, Hoffa called their bluff too – and pulled the IBT out of the AFL-CIO rather than submit to the labor federation’s new government-dictated ethical practices rules. There wasn’t anything the government could do to get Hoffa to bow down to them. Beyond character, Hoffa also had the advantage that the trucking companies really loved him, and they very much wanted to have him continue running the Teamsters no matter what the government (or the rest of the capitalist class) wanted. Hoffa saw the world the way the trucking company owners did – and with good reason, because he was one of them! During the 1940’s and 50’s, Hoffa had started a number of transportation related businesses in and around Detroit, including the car service at Detroit Airport and a company called Test Fleet that leased trucks and union drivers out to other firms. For legal reasons (the Department of Labor’s ban on employers being union officials being the primary one) Hoffa concealed his ownership of these firms by having them incorporated in the names of his wife, or other relatives, or close friends. Hoffa also had a vision of what the trucking industry could be, and he used the union and his relationship with the carriers to develop the industry’s potential. He also saw the union’s new but rapidly growing pension funds as a significant alternative source of capital for marginal industries like construction and trucking and, with the aid of college professor turned labor racketeer Alan Dorfman, he did his best to invest those funds accordingly (the casinos of Las Vegas were initially financed by Central States Conference Pension Fund loans). He didn’t let little trifles like the needs and grievances of truck drivers and loading dock workers get in the way of that grand vision. Hoffa did improve drivers’ pay and benefits where he could – but he would turn around and take those same improvements away from drivers if a trucking firm claimed they needed those concessions to stay profitable. The trucking industry bosses saw Hoffa as one of their own, and they did their level best to defend him from prosecution to the extent they could. Freight teamsters also saw Hoffa as one of their own, and loved him just as deeply as their bosses did. Despite the fact that Hoffa would think nothing of sacrificing their interests if it served the carriers, he simultaneously aggressively cultivated a “man of the people” image among his members. Hoffa still lived pretty much like he had when he was a warehouse worker – he wore cheap off the rack suits, he, his wife, his two kids and his foster son lived in a small house in Detroit (he shared a small apartment with another Teamsters official when he was in Washington DC working at IBT international headquarters). Hoffa had also traded in his business agent’s Cadillac for a far more humble Pontiac sedan. Despite the simple lifestyle, Hoffa was actually a millionaire at this point – but, unlike other affluent IBT officers, Hoffa did not flaunt his wealth in the face of his members. Most of his money was either quietly invested through fronts and facemen – or used to finance the college educations of his two biological children, James and Barbara (his foster son, Charles “Chuckie” O’Brien, followed in Hoffa’s footsteps as a union official). Unlike his predecessors Dan Tobin and Dave Beck, who rarely left their offices, and who avoided the company of truckers and warehouse workers like the plague even when they were on the road, Hoffa spent as much time as possible out in the field, traveling to trucking terminals and warehouses and meeting regular teamsters. He gave out his office phone number to every teamster he met – and if they called his office, he would come to the phone, speak to them directly – often pleasantly surprising them by actually remembering their names - and he would either solve their personal grievance or give them a good sounding reason why it could not be solved. Consequently, the truckers saw Hoffa as one of their own made good – and admired him for being a loading dock millionaire who was living the “American dream”. This enormous political capital enabled Hoffa to get away with many betrayals of the interests of freight workers.

It also made it very difficult for the feds to go after him, since it was clear he had a huge mass base among freight workers – and those workers had the social power to shut down around 80% of the freight industry in the United States. Not that Hoffa would ever mobilize them to do that – he had repeatedly assured the carriers that he would never ever call a national strike. Hoffa would allow local strikes over grievances - particularly against the marginal carriers – especially the small time outfits that a) didn’t pay tribute to cosa nostra and b) were trying to undercut the carriers that did and/or the major carriers in the industry. But Hoffa and the conference, joint council and local officers underneath him would almost always settle the local strikes within 3 days time. Hoffa was also quick to offer “white paper agreements” – special union contracts with substandard wages, benefits and work rules, for companies who claimed that they had some sort of financial hardship and/or were willing to pay bribes for the privilege of having a low wage contract. A common form those bribes took in the Detroit area was for firms to lease trucks and teamster drivers from Test Fleet, a trucking company owned by Hoffa but listed in his wife’s maiden name. The labor stability of the Hoffa era enabled the modern trucking industry to take form. Some carriers (the Less Than Truckload or LTL outfits) built networks of terminals across the country.

They would have city drivers pick up small loads from many customers.

Those loads would then be consolidated by destination at the terminals by the dockworkers, and road drivers would take those loads to other terminals in that carrier’s network.

The city drivers, dockworkers and other terminal workers were paid by the hour, the road drivers were paid by the mile on the road, and by the hour for all of their non driving related work. Other carriers (Truckload companies) would pick up complete truckloads of goods from their customers, and then deliver those loads to wherever it was they needed to go to. Still other carriers only carried particular commodities – steel, coal, cars, oil, chemicals, ect ect ect. Even with Hoffa’s white paper deals, freight teamsters were among the best paid workers in the union - some construction drivers and movie set teamsters made more money, but that was about it. Meanwhile, as Hoffa simultaneously served the interests of the freight carriers and convinced freight workers that he was their best friend and struggled to stay out of prison, cosa nostra sunk it’s teeth deeper into non over the road freight related IBT crafts in the big Eastern and Central States cities. The Justice Department’s “Get Hoffa” prosecution effort (yes, they actually called it that) didn’t deter the goodfellas – if anything, it emboldened them! In New York City, Matty the Horse Ianello, Anthony “Gaspipe” Casso and Bernard Adelstein (a one legged gangster who never let his disability limit him from being a fully functional labor racketeer) organized a cartel in the commercial waste hauling industry. First, they were able to get New York City Mayor Robert Wagner to privatize commercial waste hauling. Second, they got the construction, ash and waste paper hauling firms to monopolize the industry.

Using the three employers associations that represented every union private waste hauling company in the city, they assigned every single commercial building and store in the city to one of 300 firms in those associations. Those assignments were permanent – if a customer wanted to change waste haulers, they’d have to ask Matty the Horse, Gaspipe or Adelstein for permission to switch - and pay a bribe in return for that favor. And if a waste hauling company was foolish enough to try and break into the industry without permission, Adelstein’s union, Teamsters local 813, would shut that wastehauler down with a strike and/or arson, beatings, truck vandalism or other types of violence. But if the wastehaulers went along with the program, they were guaranteed to make a handsome profit, with no fear of competitors coming in undercharging them. The wastehaulers also got sweetheart contracts for the workers in their truck terminals and garbage dumps. They were excluded from Teamsters local 813 and parceled out to locals 445, 958 or 970 of the Mason Tenders District Council, a cosa nostra dominated umbrella group of construction laborers local unions affiliated to the Laborers International Union of North America, the nation’s most heavily mobbed up international union. The garbage racket was so big, it took three different mob families to run it – the Genovese, Gambino and Lucchese families jointly ran the waste hauling rackets. Adelstein also had a side racket – through another Teamsters local he ran, local 1034, he sold sweetheart union contracts to funeral homes and oil barrel factories. Between Adelstein, Matty the Horse and Johnny Dio, most of the Teamster factory worker locals in New York City were in the sweetheart contract racket (very few of the IBT represented manufacturing workers in the city had anything even remotely resembling legitimate union representation in those years). Teamsters local 966 was a good example – it signed sweetheart contracts with printing shops that needed to have a union label on their products for business reasons, but who didn’t want to pay Allied Printing Trades Council wages and benefits. Local 966’s specialty was blueprint printing shops – they needed a union label on their products (which were used in the then 100% unionized New York construction industry) – but they didn’t want to pay the labor costs that went with a legit union label. Local 966 solved that problem for them – they got a union label on their blueprints, and non union level pay and benefits in the shops. Teamster locals 210 and 240 provided similar services for garment shops that had to have a union contract, but who didn’t want to have to provide International Ladies Garment Workers Union or Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union wage scales and benefit coverage. Teamsters local 810 served machine shops that needed to be unionized but who did not want to live up to the wage and benefits standards of Machinists District 15 or Sheet Metal Workers local 28 or Ironworkers local 455. Johnny Dio eventually “retired” – he got life in a federal prison, for having a hitman pour acid in the eyes of New York Times labor reporter Victor Riesel Riesel lived – and even though he’d been blinded he kept on writing about thugs like Johnny Dio. Johnny Dio spent the rest of his life behind bars, and died a convict’s death in a federal prison infirmary. As for the New York City Teamsters? Of the 49 IBT locals in the city in the late 1950’s, 31 had ties to organized crime. All 5 of New York City’s cosa nostra families (Genovese, Gambino, Lucchese, Colombo and Bonnano) plus the De Cavalcante family from New Jersey, plus various independent gangsters all got a piece of the action. Most locals only had one set of wiseguys feeding on the union. Some unfortunate unions had multiple racketeers preying on them. Like Teamsters local 295, which represented air freight drivers at Idlewild Field (the city’s international airport – it was renamed after President John F Kennedy after his 1963 assassination) IBT local 295 chief Harry Davidoff, Lucchese family captain Paul Vario, Gambino family captain Aniello “Mr Neil” Dellacroche and truck hijacker James “Jimmy the Gent” Burke worked together to organize the air freight forwarding rackets. All of the freight forwarders (trucking companies that carried freight between the airports and the shippers) were required to join a cosa nostra-controlled employers association, the Metropolitan Import Truckmen’s Association (MITA). Like in the carting industry, MITA required that all the carriers have IBT local 295 union contracts (although a modest payoff to Davidoff could guarantee a low wage sweetheart contract) and MITA assigned which company was allowed to pick up freight from particular customers and haul it to particular airlines. Trucking companies who went along with the deal were guaranteed high freight rates and no competition. Those carriers who didn’t would have serious problems – not only from Davidoff’s Teamsters local, but from hijackers who operated under the protection of Vario, Mr Neil and Jimmy the Gent, who would ambush their trucks on the more isolated side roads in Howard Beach or South Jamaica, Queens and steal their cargo. Of course, even the companies that went along with the racket had to give up a part of their freight to the truck hijackers. Vario, Mr.

Neil and Jimmy the Gent – in league with local bar owners near the airport, many of whom were gangsters in their own right – also ran illegal betting and loansharking rings preying on air freight teamsters. They would get guys hooked on betting, lend them gambling money at extremely high interest rates, get them deep in debt and then force them to pay off their debts by helping the wiseguys to steal cargo. Davidoff’s IBT local 295 would make sure that they didn’t get fired for their thefts – so they could keep paying off their debts with stolen freight. Incidentally, those luckless gamblers were just about the only Idlewild Field air freight teamsters who got any sort of protection from local 295 in those days. The freight carriers didn’t really give a damn about the hijackings – they were making money hand over fist thanks to the MITA’s air freight cartel and, after all, the freight was insured and it wasn’t their property anyway. The shippers and the airlines DID care very much about the hijackings. But they didn’t want to risk a strike from Davidoff’s Teamsters local. More importantly they were terrified of Vario, Mr Neil and Jimmy the Gent. All three of those guys were notorious killers in their own right. Jimmy the Gent in particular was a ferocious figure – he allegedly carried out his first killing at age 11, was a full time hitman in his early teens and was still killing people himself on a regular basis (often over personal slights that had nothing to do with racketeering) even after he became a major organized crime figure. Vario and Mr.

Neil, while nowhere near as personally violent as Jimmy the Gent, had also murdered people themselves as well. They also had hitmen ready and willing to murder their enemies and make their bodies disappear into the swamps of South Queens or under the waters of Jamaica Bay on a phone call’s notice. In the face of malevolent enemies like that, the airlines and the customers who shipped freight on their planes could do nothing but sit still and take it. Rackets like that were precisely the reason why the feds were going after Hoffa. Those rackets were very good for the trucking companies – in particular the more established carriers, who wanted to protect their businesses from competition from new entrants to the market who might try to undercut their prices. But it was that freight price stability – and the subpar service that was the inevitable result of freight service monopolization - that hurt the profits of the corporations who’s freight was being hauled to market by these carriers. The feds were fighting for the interests of those big capitalists, against the small trucking companies that they felt were overcharging them, thanks to the Teamsters and cosa nostra. But they were having a very difficult time prosecuting Hoffa (and an even harder time going after all the local labor racketeers across the Eastern and Central States conferences who ran those rackets on the ground). While the corrupt local Teamsters officials ran their rackets in local trucking and non-freight related IBT industries, Hoffa continued his efforts to centralize over the road freight bargaining. Almost as soon as he came into office, Hoffa centralized grievance handling in the freight industry.

All grievances that couldn’t be settled at either at the terminals by shop stewards and terminal managers or at the local union level by business agents and trucking company personnel managers went to panels at the conference level. Hoffa co-chaired all of these panels, and he was responsible for every major ruling by the grievance panels.

Hoffa (an insomniac workaholic who’s normal work day began at 6AM and ended after midnight every day of the week) personally wrote many of the opinions – and approved every word of the ones he didn’t. Hoffa thus became the central arbiter of all major disputes in the American road freight industry.

The high level of trust that both truckers and bosses had in him (both groups thought he was on their side 100%) was what made this possible. Meanwhile, the IBT was expanding far beyond trucking. In part this was because the union had an aggressive organizing culture, made even bolder by the withdrawal from the AFL-CIO. Now Article XX, the “no raiding clause” of the AFL-CIO constitution, no longer applied, so IBT organizers could, and did, go after all sorts of workers (literally from apple juice cannery workers to zookeepers). The Teamsters began to unionize public workers aggressively – in large part coasting on major victories won by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and the Building Service Employees International Union that compelled several states – starting with New York – to legalize civil service worker labor unions. The IBT’s flagship public employees union, City Employees Union local 237 in New York City, became the Teamsters single largest affiliate, with over 25,000 members, when it organized several large groups of New York City civil servants AFSCME District Council 37 only narrowly beat them in the election to be the primary municipal clerical and service workers union in NYC. Local 237 ended up with numerous miscellaneous bargaining units – housing authority janitors and maintenance workers were, by far, the largest group, but local 237 also got bridge tenders, public hospital cooks and security guards for municipal buildings and public schools among other titles. At least they got decent pay (in large part because DC 37, as the main City of New York civil service labor organization, was the lead union in municipal bargaining – the local 237 agreement was a me-too contract based on the DC 37 agreement). Most other non trucking teamsters – especially factory workers in big cities – had low wage sweetheart contracts. The Teamsters became the fastest growing union in the country. And the sweetheart ‘white paper agreements’ began to seep even more aggressively into trucking. For example, a department store delivery firm called United Parcel Service. In 1964, UPS founder and principal owner Jim Casey decided to shift the firm’s core business from department store delivery to parcel post service. The old UPS was based on it’s trucks waiting outside downtown department stores in big cities, picking up packages from carless shoppers, and delivering their goods to their home. That business model no longer made sense. Most Americans had cars now, and a majority of US residents were suburbanites who drove to far flung shopping malls.

They didn’t need anybody to deliver their packages – because they carried them in the trunk or the backseat! But, mail order shopping was on the rise – and those companies did need somebody to haul their packages from their warehouses to the homes of their customers. The US Post Office Department had a virtual monopoly on that business – and, like all monopolies, their prices were high and their service was poor. Casey wanted to go head to head with the US Post Office. He wanted to set up a network of “service centers” (UPS internal corporate jargon for what other firms called terminals or freight barns), similar to the ones used by less than truckload (LTL) carriers. UPS local “package cars” (delivery vans) would pick up packages from customers, ferry them to the service center, “sorters” (loading dockworkers and warehouse workers) would sort the packages, put the out of town packages in “feeder trucks” (over the road tractor trailers) bound for other UPS service centers, unload feeder trucks from those centers, load up the package cars with the next day’s deliveries and send them on their way in the morning. The LTL carriers did this with a largely full time workforce, supplemented by casual teamster dockworkers hired by the day. UPS wanted to have a part time workforce do this work, for maximal flexibility and minimum labor costs – and they needed a special deal from Hoffa to do that. UPS had been a union carrier since 1907 – back before they even had trucks (they were a bike messenger firm back then) – so Hoffa would have a hard time changing their older local agreements (Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City ect). But UPS had regional agreements with the IBT- in the Southern Conference, the Western Conference outside of Seattle and Portland, the Central States Conference outside of Chicago and the Eastern Conference outside of New York City. Hoffa personally negotiated those contracts, so he could – and did – change those agreements in 1964, letting UPS hire an unlimited number of part timers. UPS could – and did – pressure the Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Chicago and New York City locals to go along with the program and the IBT backed up UPS on that every step of the way. Hoffa had shown the Motor Freight Carriers Association that he would look out for them – and when he promised that there would never be a national truckers strike, they believed him. So, in April 1964, MFCA and the Teamsters signed the National Master Freight Agreement – covering 15,000 trucking lines with 400,000 road drivers, city drivers, dockworkers, casuals, mechanics, clericals, yard drivers, truck washers ect ect ect and expiring in March 1967. The independent Chicago Truck Drivers Union and Teamsters Joint Council # 25 signed a parallel “me too” NMFA-patterned agreement for 20,000 Chicago-area freight workers, 30,000 teamsters covered by “white paper agreements” in New York City, Long Island, New Jersey, Detroit, Ohio and other areas also had their agreements tied to the NMFA and a few small units of diesel mechanics and helpers represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers also had contracts that followed the NMFA pattern. Hoffa had brought order to the industry – and he was trusted by the bosses to keep competition at bay, keep the truckers in line, and guarantee stable profits for freight industry bosses (especially the big trucking lines who needed protection from all the small outfits and the independent “gypsy truckers”). Hoffa was also facing more legal troubles – he’d beaten the Test Fleet corruption case (by bribing a juror), but now he was being tried for jury tampering! This time, the feds got Hoffa – he was convicted, and sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.

Hoffa and his lawyers launched a blizzard of motions and filed the necessary appeals, but that only delayed his eventual incarceration by a couple of years. Meanwhile, the modest pay increases in the NMFA were swallowed up by the galloping inflation touched off by the Vietnam War – causing quite a bit of dissention at the truck terminals. Also, the steelhaulers were very dissatisfied by the kind of representation they were getting from the IBT.

These drivers were owner operators who owned their own trucks and flatbed chassis, and who contracted with the steel hauling carriers on a per load basis (with the mileage rates set by Teamster contract). They had special issues related to the fees they got for the rental of their trucks, plus the matter of unpaid waiting time at the steel mills. The union, which had always treated them as stepchildren, ignored them. Plus the UPS workers in Teamsters local 804 in New York City had issues – they were under a lot of pressure to allow unlimited part timers, as was permitted in the national UPS agreement, and UPS was even routing work out of New Jersey (where Teamsters local 177 worked under that inferior pact) to evade the higher New York City labor costs. Hoffa was able to keep a lid on these issues – and even to negotiate a new 1967-1970 NMFA with the same inadequate economic package as the first NMFA – because of the illusions that most teamsters still had in him. But in January 1967 Hoffa’s appeals came to an end, and he was ordered to report to the United States Prison at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania to do his time. Hoffa appointed International Vice President Frank “Fitz” Fitzsimmons as his temporary replacement as IBT general president. Fitz, a former Detroit city bus driver who’d been a Hoffa aide since the late 1940’s, was widely believed by many Teamsters Union leaders to be a really dumb guy and an absolute yes man to Hoffa. Hoffa himself had that view of Fitz – and didn’t try and hide his contempt for the man (even after Fitz became an international vice president, Hoffa would still send him out to the store to get coffee for the general executive board meetings – and he would frequently berate Fitz in front of the other VP’s if Fitz didn’t make his coffee just right!) That’s exactly why he appointed Fitz as his acting president. Hoffa felt that Fitz would follow orders cause he was too stupid to make his own policy decisions. Jimmy Hoffa was totally wrong about his one-time aide. Fitz didn’t have Hoffa’s flair for public relations, or his ability to make teamsters think he cared about their needs (while selling out their interests behind their backs) or his workaholism (Fitz was strictly a 9 to 5 guy who took every day of his vacation time and spent his weekends and holidays playing golf). Nor did Fitz bother to conceal his personal wealth from the members, as Hoffa always had. He made no effort to hide his mansion in the Detroit suburbs – his other mansion in the Washington DC suburbs – or his luxury condo at the La Costa Country Club in Palm Springs – or the union supplied chauffeured Cadillac limousine he used in DC – or the Cadillac limo he had in Detroit – or the Cadillac he had in California – or the union supplied Gulfstream jet he used to commute between his three luxurious homes. But he was as committed to labor peace with the trucking companies at any price as Hoffa was – even if he wasn’t as good at making truck drivers think that those deals were in their interests when they in fact were not. Fitz was also a consensus builder – he avoided Hoffa’s micromanagement of freight labor relations, and much preferred to leave the day to day details of those special deals with the trucking companies to local Teamster officers on the scene. The Genovese family and the Chicago Outfit liked Fitz’s low key decentralized style, and decided that maybe they were better off with him than with Hoffa. Fitzsimmons, feeling the political heat from the increasingly militant freight barns, had to be a whole lot more liberal than Hoffa – in particular, Fitz had to at least go through the motions of dealing with the concerns of African American Teamsters. He had seen the July 1967 Detroit uprising up close and personal (Joint Council # 43’s offices were right in the middle of the East Side, the largest African American neighborhood in Detroit at that time – and the fires had burned right outside of the union hall) and he knew that the IBT couldn’t keep on just ignoring the concerns of it’s Black members. When Dr Martin Luther King was killed the next year, Fitzsimmons and United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther were the only White union officers who even bothered to come to the funeral. Fitz, who shared Reuther’s opposition to the Vietnam War, (which had led to the UAW’s disaffiliating from the AFL-CIO) formed an independent labor federation between the UAW and the IBT, the Alliance for Labor Action, and launched a joint UAW/IBT organizing drive among African American workers in Atlanta. None of this stuff was cleared with Hoffa – but it really didn’t matter, because Fitz was the general president (his temporary appointment was confirmed by an IBT international convention) and Hoffa was just some guy in a jail cell. But Fitz had other problems – like the wildcat strikes that were sweeping the auto plants – especially in his home city of Detroit – and were giving radical ideas to blue collar workers all over the country. Three day strikes over grievances were increasingly breaking out in the truck terminals – and it was harder and harder for Teamster business agents to get the trucks rolling again. The militant owner operator steelhaulers actually forced the IBT to call an official national strike (while simultaneously setting up their own parallel union, FASH, the Federation of American Steel Haulers, and making serious noises about pulling out of the IBT) Fitz went oldschool on the steelhaulers – FASH leaders in Youngstown, Ohio, Gary, Indiana, Cleveland and Detroit had their homes firebombed by mysterious person or persons unknown – but it didn’t stop the movement. Things came to a head in 1970. There had been a massive upsurge in wildcat strike activity in all the blue collar unions – and the United Auto Workers, International Union of Electrical Workers and United Mine Workers of America had been forced to call official strikes that their leaders had not wanted to wage because of the turmoil on the ground. The militancy had spread to public employees – with New York City letter carriers, mail handlers and postal clerks forcing the American Postal Workers Union and the National Association of Letter Carriers to call the first federal workers strike in US history. Fitz was negotiating his first NMFA that year – the April 1970-March 1973 contract – and he was under a lot of pressure from his members to get them big pay raises to keep up with rampant inflation. Problem was, the Motor Freight Carriers Association – feeling pressure from the big corporations who’s goods they hauled, wanted him to keep labor costs down. Fitz gave the MFCA what they wanted at the table – but he was not able to sell it to the truckers. The leaders of Joint Council # 25, Teamsters local 705 and the independent Chicago Truck Drivers Union, who had a separate agreement patterned on the NMFA, were forced by their angry members to call a strike. Unlike other IBT officers, the Chicago union leaders had to take full personal responsibility for their separate pact (in other words, they couldn’t pass the buck and blame Fitz if the members didn’t like it). They were not prepared to put their necks on the block like that, so they called a walkout. Since every major 48 states common carrier had routes that passed through Chicago, this touched off a national strike. Fitz and the other IBT officers didn’t call it – it spontaneously broke out. Embarrassingly enough for Fitz, his home union, Detroit local 299 (which he was – at least on paper - still the principal officer of), was a center of the wildcat strike action. But it soon spread – promoted by diverse teamsters for diverse reasons - militant shop stewards in the freight barns who wanted a fair deal for their guys, Jimmy Hoffa supporters angered at Fitz for not leaning on President Nixon to get Hoffa pardoned, communists and Trotskyists who had taken trucking jobs to spread anti Vietnam War militancy among truckers, and regular truck drivers who, without the Hoffa mystique blinding them, (and in part because their illusions in Hoffa made them hate Fitzsimmons) finally saw they were being sold out. Ohio was the epicenter of the revolt – truckers all over the state rose up against their companies – and against William and Jackie Presser, the father and son labor racketeer team who dominated the Ohio Conference of Teamsters and every major Teamster local in Northern Ohio. The Ohio truckers launched what amounted to a rolling insurrection – riding up and down the highways of that state, often getting into running gun battles with the Ohio Highway Patrol. The Pressers – and their cosa nostra buddies from Cleveland and Youngstown – were completely unable to break the strike, despite their best efforts. Governor Rhodes actually had to call out the Ohio National Guard to deal with the armed wildcatting Teamsters. Incidentally, the Ohio National Guard soldiers who were deployed at Kent State University to stop students from protesting against the invasion of Cambodia – the troops who fired on those students on May 4, 1970, killing 4 and wounding 15 - had also been on the anti truckers strike detail for most of the previous month. That’s why they had loaded M-14 rifles. And that’s why they were so comfortable with firing live rounds at White American civilians (because that’s what they’d been doing for the previous few weeks). The strike spread as far east as New York City and as far west as Los Angeles – truckers there even shut down the seaport, the nation’s second largest. At peak, 200,000 freight teamsters were involved in the work stoppage. This was the biggest wildcat strike in American history. The Motor Freight Carriers Association and it’s member carriers were outraged! The Fortune 500 companies who’s products they delivered were screaming blue bloody murder – and they had to stand there looking stupid, because they couldn’t live up to their service guarantees to their clients. Hoffa had sworn up and down to MFCA in 1964 that there would never ever be a national Teamsters freight strike. And yet, now they faced….a national Teamsters freight strike. And none of those tough guy Teamsters could get the trucks rolling again – not Fitz, not the Pressers, not the Provenzanos in New Jersey, not Gunner Hansen on the Los Angeles waterfront, not Joseph “Joe T” Trerotola, “Matty the Horse” and all the other thugs in New York – none of these slick talking gangsters were able to live up to their promises to the carriers! Eventually, the strike fizzled out, and for only the cost of a few minor economic concessions the NMFA and it’s pattern agreements were finally ratified. But the trucking companies never forgot April 1970. Nor did they ever forgive – their drivers, or the IBT! After the truckers returned to work, there was a massive wave of retaliatory firings across the country – most of the leaders of the 1970 wildcat lost their jobs. Jobs were plentiful then, so they were quickly able to get work elsewhere, but the message was sent – especially when the IBT let the militants get fired (even the ones who were official Teamsters Union shop stewards – who were explicitly protected from firing by Article 4 and Article 21 of the NMFA)! This was the beginning of the end for the dissident movement in the Teamsters – Fitz was raising the price of dissent to a fee too high for most truckers to pay. Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen consumers rights group and a small Trotskyist sect called the International Socialists (later to be renamed “Solidarity”) came in and picked up the remnants of that movement. Nader had some of his young activists set up a highway safety group called the Professional Drivers Council (which, despite it’s name was NOT run by actual truckers – it was strictly controlled by college-educated professional activists). The International Socialists had sent a number of their college student members into the trucking industry to carry out political agitation on the job a few years earlier, during the waning days of the 1960’s. One of those activists, University of California at Berkeley physics major turned Cleveland Teamsters local 405 Yellow Freight truck driver Kenneth Paff, founded a group called Teamsters for a Decent Contract (later to be renamed Teamsters for a Democratic Union). Meanwhile, Fitz tried to placate Hoffa supporters by lobbying President Nixon and the US Bureau of Prisons to free Hoffa. The feds and Fitz agreed – but with a catch. Hoffa could come home but would be banned from union activism until 1980. Hoffa agreed to that deal while sitting in his cold dank cell in the United States Prison at Lewisburg – but changed his mind when he got home to Detroit. Of course, by then, it was too late – he’d signed the federal conditional release papers (which he – and his lawyers – had read beforehand) and that was that. Hoffa got a paralegal job at his son Jim Hoffa’s labor law firm in Detroit (a cover for his continued labor activism, which was a conditional release violation). Fitz kept his job as president of the second largest union in the United States – 2.3 million members (only the 4 million member National Education Association was bigger than the IBT) The union was expanding – in typical Teamsters fashion. The IBT absorbed the Brewery Workers International Union, an AFL-CIO affiliate who’s jurisdiction overlapped with the Teamsters;

BWIU members brewed the beer while Teamsters drove the beer delivery trucks. The BWIU was on the decline – between job loss from new beer brewing technology to competition driving many small New York City, Milwaukee and St Louis beer companies out of business to Coors Beer’s strikebreaking at their flagship brewery in Golden, Colorado, the Brewery Workers Union was in trouble and needed to be bailed out. Fitzsimmons launched a North America-wide boycott of Coors Beer that would last until 1988 – but that token show of militancy was about all the Teamsters Union did for the brewery workers Out West, the Teamsters Union reverted to old school Dave Beck-style goon squad thuggery in the lettuce fields. The United Farm Workers of America, a small AFL-CIO union that had grown out of the Mexican American civil rights movement of the 1960’s, had finally gotten a union contract in the grape and lettuce fields of California after a 6 year long strike. That agreement expired in 1973 – and as the clock ticked towards the expiration date, Fitz approached the Associated Farmers (the main agribusiness employers association in the state) and offered the IBT as a pro business alternative to the UFW. The Associated Farmers jumped at the chance to get a pro company union. Fitz hastily chartered agricultural locals in the San Joaquin valley of California - Dave Beck-style locals that were in trusteeship from the day they were chartered and were run by Fitz’s hand picked flunkies. A Teamsters official actually told reporters that this was because Mexicans weren’t intelligent enough to run their own unions – so they needed White officers to run their unions for them! It was all downhill from there. Fitz approached the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club to hire “union organizers” – and the IBT hired dozens of gangbangers from that notoriously violent motorcycle gang to staff those undemocratic trusteed locals. Since the Hells Angels was – and is – an all White gang, many of who’s members wore Nazi or Confederate insignia on their clothing (or had swastika, Iron Cross or Confederate flag tattoos on their bodies) the racist message to the Latino workers was crystal clear. This blatant gangster unionism was all done with astonishing openness – many of the Hells Angels “organizer” thugs openly wore their gang colors (sleeveless leather motorcycle vests with the name of the Hells Angels chapter they belonged to and the Hells Angels logo sewn on the back) when they were in the field “organizing” for the Teamsters Union! Much of said “organizing” consisted of bullying UFW members into signing IBT authorization cards – usually in the fields on company time in full view of the ranchers and their foremen. Of course, the same ranchers and foremen would instantly call the lawyers and file an unfair labor practices complaint with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board if the UFW’s organizers were to engage in pro union solicitation in the fields! Ironic – considering that the typical UFW organizer was either an ex farmworker or a liberal college student or a Catholic priest or a left wing activist – while the IBT’s so called “union organizers” were gangbangers with long criminal records, many of whom had never done an honest day’s work in life. The gangbangers also attacked UFW picketlines, and roamed around the farming towns of California harassing and beating UFW supporters. Oddly, this open thuggery was pretty much invisible to the California Highway Patrol and to the local sheriff’s departments of the farm belt counties - even when the beatings happened in broad daylight in the middle of town. In short, it was Al Capone’s Chicago-style baseball bat unionism brought to the Central California high desert. The UFW won the public relations battle, easily. Which wasn’t that hard – many liberal and leftist Hollywood actors were vocal UFW supporters, and their high profiles helped the union get good press. And, of course, the spectacle of non violent Gandhian labor activists being beaten by Hells Angels thugs was pretty damned clear – it would be difficult for anybody with an ounce of humanity to not feel instant sympathy for the beleaguered UFW and to hate the thuggish Teamsters Union with a passion. But, the IBT won the labor relations war. The Associated Farmers got the ALRB to recognize the fraudulently collected Teamsters Union petitions, and signed sweetheart contracts with the IBT that weren’t worth the paper they were printed on. And the UFW’s membership shrank from 100,000 after the 1970 contract to less than 5,000 after 1973. Fitzsimmons was also desperately trying to prove a point – he wanted to show the bosses that he would do ANYTHING for them, no matter how low or vile. His real audience wasn’t the ranchers of California – but the Motor Freight Carriers Association and their member companies. In a way, the Teamsters Union was doing high profile penance for the “sin” of not breaking the 1970 wildcat strike! As the Teamsters Union sank to it’s lower depths of gangster unionism in the fields of California, it shrank away from it’s heights of activist unionism in the inner city ghettoes of Georgia. The Alliance for Labor Action, the IBT’s labor federation with the United Auto Workers, had finally fallen apart. The minifederation’s organizing drive among African American workers in Atlanta collapsed – mainly because the IBT and UAW’s organizing staffs narrow legalistic NLRB-style organizing techniques were inadequate to the task of unionizing several thousand workers at multiple employers. Only an area-wide simultaneous strike at all of those companies would have been able to organize those workers. The White dominated conservative leaderships of Atlanta Teamsters local 728 and United Auto Workers Region 5 were not prepared to do that. Especially if such a strike would lead to several thousand militant African American workers coming into their unions and, due to the militant circumstances of their unionization, wanting to fully participate in the life of the union. That would pose a special danger – since strikes always result in new leaders coming from the ranks, and those new leaders would almost certainly challenge the good old boys for leadership in those unions. Not to mention the racial factor – Teamsters local 728 and the UAW Region 5 locals in Atlanta were very much White dominated, and had only desegregated recently and reluctantly (basically because the Civil Rights Act made it a federal crime for them to stay jim crow unions). They didn’t want a bunch of Blacks coming to their union meetings – and maybe even attending union picnics and social events! The good ole boys were even more horrified at the thought that some of those African Americans might run for union office – and possibly even win! These bigots would rather have Atlanta stay non union if the price of organizing the city was to have African American led multiracial unions. So the local UAW and IBT officers dragged their feet – filed as few NLRB elections as possible and even those were pursued as nonaggressively as possible. As a result, very few workers were organized, despite the thousands who had initially rallied to the campaign.

Also, the ALA’s “Community Union” program had fizzled as well – in large part because it was competing for government and corporate grant foundation funding with other not for profit social service programs, many of which were more well established and had stronger ties with the Democratic Party. So the ALA fizzled, the Atlanta organizing drive collapsed, and what was left of the “Community Union” program was spun off into an independent not for profit, run by UAW staff and funded by the Ford Foundation. Meanwhile, Fitz and the MFCA were busy negotiating the April 1973 – March 1976 National Master Freight Agreement. The talks were happening in a very different climate than the 1970 talks. The Vietnam War was still raging – but since the withdrawal of American infantry in January 1971 almost no Americans were dying - which pretty much killed off the US anti war movement. Between the death of the anti war movement and the collapse of the African American Civil Rights Movement, the whole political climate in America had drifted sharply to the right. On the labor front, the US economy was dipping into a deep recession that, as it would turn out, ended up marking the end of total American domination of the world economy. American workers were learning this the hard way – through plant closings and mass layoffs.

It wasn’t as easy to find a job as it was in 1970 – and even those who were working were seeing the value of their wages declining rapidly because of double digit inflation. Consequently, wildcat strikes were rare – and it was easier for unions to get their members to settle for bad contracts. The IBT was no exception – the teamster dissident movement was in it’s death throes, and the remains of that movement in Nader’s Professional Drivers Council and the International Socialists’ Teamsters for a Decent Contract were not nearly strong enough to carry out any kind of serious resistance on the ground. As for Jimmy Hoffa and his movement – they basically agreed with Fitz’s approach to the contract, their only difference was that they wanted Hoffa at the table instead of Fitz! In any case, Fitz’s supporters and Hoffa’s supporters were busy scuffling with each other in various Teamsters locals over who would hold office. Some of these fights got quite ugly – in Detroit in particular…the hometown of both men…it gut really ugly really fast, with the usual Central States Teamsters tactics of firebombings and carbombs and beatings – especially in local 299, the home local of both Hoffa and Fitzsimmons. The truly amazing thing about all the violence was the fact that Jimmy Hoffa and Frank Fitzsimmons positions on Teamster labor issues were IDENTICAL. There was no political difference between Fitz’s supporters and Jimmy’s – except the question of which one of them would run the union. The victor in that struggle would be able to give out all the low show and no show patronage jobs – organizers, business agents, “general organizers” – that served “at the pleasure of the General President” and all the goodies that went with those jobs – high five figure salaries, Cadillac sedans or Lincoln Town Cars (with the gas paid for by the union) union credit cards, trips to Florida, Las Vegas or Palm Springs on “union business” ect. To some, those perks were worth killing and dying for. In this climate, Fitz was able to ram through a really bad NMFA. The trucking companies won the right to fire shop stewards for leading wildcat strikes - and the union pledged itself to help them do it. In return for becoming a designated strikebreaker, the IBT and it’s locals won immunity from damage lawsuits for those illegal wildcat strikes. Stewards had their rights sharply curtailed – they were specifically banned from calling any type of work stoppage, legal or otherwise, and their powers at the truck terminals were sharply limited to being in the room when a worker gets disciplined and putting up official Teamsters Union notices on the bulletin board! It also became much easier for trucking companies to fire any other worker who led a wildcat strike – and to impose discipline on strike participants. As bad as that was, the worst giveback - the one that caused the most long term harm for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as a freight union and led to the present day deunionization of the industry, was in an MOU [“memorandum of understanding”] attached to the agreement. It was called the Special Commodities Rider. The Motor Freight Carriers Association had claimed that some of it’s member firms in the truckload sector wanted to haul fresh fruit and vegetables from the farms to the warehouses and frozen foods packing plants, but they could not profitably do so because the Teamsters pay scale was so much higher than what non union produce truck drivers were getting. So, the MFCA wanted it’s carriers to have the right to hire non union drivers to haul that cargo – and non union dockworkers and mechanics to handle the cargo and service those non union operated rigs. Fitz agreed with the MFCA’s request. The Special Commodities Rider required that the non union drivers and terminal workers would be employed by separate divisions of the union trucking companies – totally abandoning the NMFA’s Successorship Clause. Successorship clauses are common in almost all craft union labor contracts in this country – they require that if the owners of the signatory companies open up new firms in the same business, they have to be covered by the same union contract. It’s a way of keeping unionized bosses from setting up shell companies as a way of dodging their obligations under their union agreements. The Special Commodities Rider totally gutted the NMFA’s successorship clause. Worse yet, despite the MFCA’s dubious claim that the union carriers only wanted to haul fresh produce, there was no limit on what type of cargo could be hauled by the non union subsidiaries of trucking companies. Nor was their a limit on how much freight or how many routes had to be left on the union side of these companies – the agreement only said that they had to leave some of their routes union – that literally could mean 1 truck with 1 driver hauling 1 load for 1 client! Schneider National, the first Teamster employer to invoke the Special Commodities Rider, sure as hell interpreted it like that. They were a 48 state truckload carrier based in Wisconsin – they set up a non union company with an almost identical name [Schneider – which was so similar to the union company that they literally painted their trucks the same color – orange with the company name written in black], and quickly shifted almost all of their freight from their union side to their scab side. In short order, the non union Schneider ended up with 10,000 non union truckload drivers – and unionized Schneider National was reduced to 250 teamster drivers. Incidentally, despite the MFCA’s claims that the Special Commodities Rider was needed to help union companies haul fresh produce, the only cargo left with the unionized Schneider National was….fresh milk! In other words, the only cargo they hauled union was the very type of agricultural freight that, supposedly, they needed low wage non union workers to haul!!! Every other Schneider National truckload client switched over to the lower cost non union Schneider. Within a few years, almost the entire truckload sector of the freight industry shifted from union to this new status. The less than truckload sector would follow within a decade. Thusly the Teamsters entered the age of Double Breasting – the term the carriers made up to describe their new status as part unionized part scab firms. This was an earthshaking development – but nobody talked about it at the time – not Nader’s middle class driver advocates in the Professional Drivers Council, not the International Socialists and their Teamsters for a Decent Contract, not Jimmy Hoffa and his supporters (now united in a national group of their own, which was unimaginatively named “Helping Old Friends Feel Active” – the abbreviation of which, of course, spells H.O.F.F.A.) Hoffa’s forces were too busy fighting Fitz’s people for control of local 299 and other major Central States locals to actually struggle over a question of union principle! Especially since Hoffa – who’d been signing substandard “white paper” contracts with freight carriers since 1939 – essentially agreed with how Fitz handled the 73’ – ’76 NMFA negotiations! Hoffa’s only beef was that he wasn’t at the head of the table making the sellout! As for the militant shop stewards in the terminals – the folks who had led the 1970 nationwide wildcat strike – between the recession and the IBT letting the carriers fire aggressive shop stewards pretty much at will, they had had their spirit broken and were unable to lead any effective resistance to the 1973 contract. The only major Teamsters strike that year was the strike by Teamsters local 804 at UPS in New York City and Long Island.

The issue was the substandard National UPS Agreement which, by allowing unlimited part timers, undercut the New York agreement. New Jersey Teamsters local 177 (an affiliate of the Genovese family dominated Joint Council # 70 – run by the Provenzano brothers) openly scabbed on the local 804 UPS teamsters. That led to local 804 picketing New Jersey UPS service centers which led to local 804 members being arrested and one local 804 teamster actually getting run over and killed by a local 177 member at a New Jersey terminal that was breaking the strike by handling strikebound packages from New York City. Eventually, local 804 was forced to yield – and, along with UPS locals in Seattle, San Francisco and Chicago was eventually put under the substandard National Master UPS Agreement. This was the beginning of UPS’s status as one of the nation’s leading low wage employers of disposable part time labor – a status all the more galling because UPS was a unionized company! The president of local 804, Marine Corps veteran and second generation UPS driver Ron Carey, never forgave Fitz for 1973 – so he used his street smarts and the fact that his local was in New York City, the media capital of the nation, to launch a low key campaign for the general presidency of the Teamsters. While Fitz was undercutting union conditions at the nation’s # 1 small package firm, he was doing absolutely nothing to unionize the # 2 carrier. That was a Memphis, Tennessee-based air freight carrier/express mail delivery firm owned by former Marine Corps fighter pilot Fred Smith – a company called Federal Express (a name the company’s advertising consultants soon shortened to FedEx). They were fast, and efficient – and rigidly militaristic to work for – and as FedEx rapidly expanded in every major US market, the Teamsters made absolutely no effort to try and unionize them. The nation’s # 3 small package carrier, a Dayton, Ohio-based air freight company called Airborne Express, was allowed to operate double breasted. In New York, Harry Davidoff’s grotesquely mobbed up local 295 had Airborne signed up to a white paper agreement based on NMFA. Like many other airfreight carriers at John F.

Kennedy International Airport, Airborne Express was permitted by Davidoff to assign part of their workforce to Teamsters local 858, a low wage airfreight clerks local run by his son Mike. Also, like every other airfreight carrier at JFK, Airborne also had to deal with the men behind Davidoff – Lucchese family captain Paul Vario, newly minted Gambino family captain John Gotti (a convicted truck hijacker who had replaced the ailing Aniello “Mr Neil” Dellacroche) and independent truck hijacker James “Jimmy the Gent” Burke – all of whom expected their tribute, and the right to steal air freight without interference. Airborne’s pilots, mechanics and freight handlers in Dayton were also signed up to an NMFA-based white paper agreement. As for the rest of the company – Airborne was allowed to use an unlimited number of non union air freight drivers and freight handlers, as long as they were – at least on paper - on the payroll of other companies. The local delivery industry, by and large, stayed union. This was true even in construction – where the building trades unions were under major attack (by 1978, most construction in the Intermountain West, the South, the suburbs of the big Northeastern, Midwestern and Pacific Northwest cities and most of California outside of the Bay Area was 80% deunionized). The IBT was able to preserve it’s strength in building materials delivery in part because of the union’s ties to cosa nostra in the Northeast, Midwest and Nevada, and in part because the lumber yards and readimix concrete companies didn’t actively deunionize the way the construction contractors did. Also, many local delivery companies – especially frozen foods warehouses – took advantage of the Teamsters Union’s willingness to allow them to cut the pension benefits of their workers. An extreme case of this happened in Alaska during the construction of the Alaska Oil Pipeline from 1973 to 76. Because of the extreme climate in that state, construction is very seasonal – work can only be done in the dead of winter, when the ice roads are cold enough to carry heavy trucks, or in the Arctic summer, when the ground is soft enough to dig. Because of this, the contractors would bring in large groups of out of state workers to carry out the work in short intense bursts of activity during the brief building season up there. In the case of Alaska Teamsters local 959, lots of teamsters from other locals in “the lower 48” would come up for a few months to haul materials to the remote work camps on the pipeline and then go home. Over 4,000 out of state teamsters worked on that pipeline – some for every season of the 3 year job. And every one of those out of state workers got cheated out of their benefits by local 959 – with the collusion of the contractors and the trucking companies (that pension fraud kept their hourly benefit costs low – since their pension fund contributions only needed to cover the relatively few permanent members of Teamsters local 959) On the other end of the country, the Provenzano brothers local 560 allowed a local less than truckload (LTL) carrier, New England Motor Freight (NEMF) to sign a white paper agreement letting them pay less than NMFA wages and benefits. Then, NEMF asked for permission to go double breasted – and Tony Pro, Sammy Pro and Nunzio said OK and let them do it. Then, NEMF decided to go completely non union – and did so, with the blessings of the Provenzanos (the only union left at NEMF was the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, which represented the company’s mechanics – years later, that IAM local would reunionize the drivers and dockworkers). Across the river in New York City, Teamsters local 138 – the supermarket and frozen food warehouse local in Brooklyn and Queens – was allowing Key Foods Supermarkets to violate seniority rules and to underpay certain workers. The Colombo family associates who ran the local would make sure that any worker who complained would be identified to the bosses – who would then fire them, and then local 138’s business agents would make sure they stayed fired by sabotaging the handling of their grievance. Local 138 wasn’t the only warehouse local selling out it’s members – far from it! Nationally, grocery warehouse locals all over the country were letting employers impose production quotas, and were laying off workers who weren’t fast enough – especially high seniority workers with higher wages and more vacation time. Technically, it was illegal to fire a worker for not meeting production quotas – but as long as the companies said the worker was fired for “not following production methods” the firing was OK. That loophole cost a lot of older teamsters their jobs and their pensions. But it wasn’t only warehouse teamsters getting screwed over – construction teamsters were taking it on the chin too – even in the Big Apple, where the construction unions were still the strongest in the nation. Building Materials Teamsters local 282, the main construction drivers local in the city, and the only major Gambino family run construction union in New York City, was deeply involved in building trades labor racketeering. Local 282 had “working teamster foremen” on every major union jobsite in the city. Despite the misleading name, “working teamster foremen” were actually shop stewards who were supposed to keep non union trucks off New York jobsites. In practice, companies that used scab trucks just had to pay tribute to the teamster foremen (who passed up a percentage to the family) in return for the right to use underpaid non union drivers. While the Gambino family and local 282 subverted truck driver unionism on the rough construction end of the trades, the Bonnano family’s local 814 did the same thing on the finish work end of the business. Teamsters local 814 – the New York City and Long Island moving van drivers and helpers – let certain commercial movers and office furniture installation contractors (the ones that paid tribute to the Bonnano family) to pay below union scale wages to their helpers on certain jobs. Locals 282 and 814 were not alone – those kind of scams were common in a number of the Genovese family dominated building trades unions in the city at that time – in particular the Carpenters, Concrete Laborers, Mason Tenders and Drywall Tapers – so it wasn’t that surprising that the Bonnano family and the Gambino family were copying those tactic in the little piece of the construction rackets they controlled. Similar deals happened all up and down the country – local trucking companies stayed union, but under substandard conditions. In port trucking, the sea freight hauling carriers and the stevedoring contractors decided to be done with the Teamsters Union. The sea freight hauling companies in Los Angeles Harbor never forgot that, alone among local trucking firms in the country, they’d been as hard hit by the national teamsters wildcat strike of 1973 as any of the over the road carriers. They also, as a direct consequence of that strike, had seen Gunner Hansen, the 400 pound pro trucking company gangster who had dominated Long Beach Teamsters local 692 for years, defeated in a union election – making it a whole lot harder for the carriers to get away with labor abuses on the piers. So, they fired all of their teamster port truckers – and agreed to hire them if they were to incorporate themselves as independent owner operator truckers, and would supply their own trucks (they only had to buy the tractors – the chassis that the sea freight containers sat on would still be supplied by the trucking companies). Teamsters local 692’s new leadership was utterly unprepared for this blatant union busting and didn’t even try to unionize the drivers – both the former teamsters and the independent drivers who came in from outside the industry and already owned their own trucks and had their own DOT numbers. Other sea freight carriers got the same idea – within a few years, most of the 50,000 teamsters who had hauled sea freight to and from the docks were no longer in union – either they’d been forced to become owner operators, or they were replaced by new owner operator truckers. None of the sea freight locals even tried to do anything about this – not in Seattle, or Portland, or Oakland, or Long Beach, or San Diego, or Houston, or New Orleans, or Tampa, or Miami, or Port Everglades, or Charleston, or Wilmington, or Norfolk, or Baltimore, or Port Newark/Port Elizabeth/Port of New York, or Boston – all of the deep sea ports had their trucking deunionized without any resistance from the IBT. Of course, the other waterfront unions were just as passive – the Communist Party USA-led International Longshore and Warehouse Union out on the West Coast was just as passive as the Gambino family associated Irish gangster-run International Longshoremen’s Association was on the East. And all 6 of the sailors unions – Masters, Mates and Pilots, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, Sailors Union of the Pacific, Marine Firemen’s Union, the Seafarers International Union and the National Maritime Union - were all totally silent on the attack on the Teamsters Union on the piers. As all this was happening, Jimmy Hoffa was preparing to contest the Teamsters General Presidency at the 1976 general convention (in – where else?

– Las Vegas, the city the Central States Pension Fund built, and venue for every IBT general convention for the last 4 decades). Not that Jimmy had any real solution to any of these problems – but he still had his charisma and his ability to lie to teamsters with a straight face and get them to believe in him while he betrayed them. Cosa nostra was not happy about this – Fitz was much easier to work with, and Hoffa was a lightning rod for law enforcement (and as it was, there was lots of FBI attention being paid to the union already). And none of the mobbed up Teamsters leaders were less happy to see a return of Hoffa than the Genovese family’s Provenzano crew. They were dealing with serious criminal charges of their own (the unavenged ghosts of Anthony Castellito and Walter Glockner were about to catch up with Tony Pro) and they did not need any more law enforcement heat – and it was the consensus of the Provenzanos and all the Teamster-connected mob bosses that there would be a LOT of heat falling upon them if there was another Hoffa administration. So, on July 30, 1975, Anthony “Tony Pro” Provenzano arranged to have a sit down with Hoffa in the suburbs of Detroit. But Tony Pro didn’t show. According to press accounts published shortly afterwards – which have never been conclusively proved, or disproved, by subsequent investigations – Tony Pro had Local 560 business agent (and Genovese family soldier) Salvatore Briguglio and his brother (and fellow Teamsters official and gangster) Gabriel flown via private plane to a small airport near Detroit. It is believed that they met up with Hoffa’s foster son, Teamsters Union “organizer” Charles “Chuckie” O’Brien, who in turn is believed to have taken them to meet his foster father. Hoffa was never seen again after July 30, 1975 – needless to say, it’s a reasonable assumption that he was murdered, and his body disposed of in a cosa nostra run scrap yard in the Detroit area. Sal Briguglio was killed in a New York mob hit 3 years later – his brother Gabriel went to jail with Tony Pro when the feds finally went after local 560 – and Chuckie O’Brien kept his mouth shut about his involvement. Hoffa’s “movement” – based as it was on illusions in Hoffa by teamsters at it’s base and blind ambition for patronage jobs from a reelected General President Hoffa by Teamsters Union officers and staff in it’s leadership – did not last very long after his murder. Hoffa’s son, labor lawyer Jim Hoffa, did make an effort to prod the feds into probing the case – and to this day, a lot of older teamsters still believe in the legend of Jimmy Hoffa The Great Labor Leader – but Hoffa’s political movement in the Teamsters Union died with him.

Some of the followers of the now defunct Hoffa movement drifted into the orbit of the International Socialists Teamsters for a Decent Contract, which was waging a campaign to oppose the 1976-79 NMFA and to have a token opposition presence at the 1976 Teamsters international convention. At this point, TDC and Ralph Nader’s Professional Drivers Council were all that were left of a once vast movement of dissident teamsters. Fitz’s only grassroots support came from the local Teamsters Union officers and their bands of thugs and gangsters. One of the more ambitious local Teamsters leaders – Jackie Presser (who had taken his father’s leadership posts when he became mortally ill with cancer, and now held 8 separate official International Brotherhood of Teamsters full time jobs plus a job with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees and one with the Retail Clerks International Association) set up an organization called the Brotherhood of Loyal Americans and Real Teamsters [“BLAST”] to counter TDC. Presser was known to have a sick sense of humor, and the name was a bad joke on Presser’s own long personal history as an arsonist and carbomber. Also, one of Presser’s 8 jobs was public relations director for the Teamsters – and this was part of that effort. The organization was basically a cover for the classic Teamsters Union goon squad terrorist campaign that Presser was unleashing against TDC, the last remnant of the once powerful dissident movement in the IBT. Presser, a very intelligent man and one of the few IBT officers (other than the late Jimmy Hoffa) who at all understood the power of the media, also exposed TDC’s achilles heel – it’s dependence on corporate foundation grants to fund it’s operation Many teamsters were – and still are – deeply uncomfortable with the idea of a group funded by the bosses intervening in the political life of their union, and Presser was able to play on that natural and basically healthy class instinct. In any case, Fitz was able to get the 1976-79 contract approved – there were small brief local strikes in some of the big cities in the Central States, most notably in his home local in Detroit, but the contract still passed. Worse yet, the main focus of TDC – and the remaining dissidents in the truck terminals – had been on the economic package. For the price of a modest wage increase, Fitz and the MFCA were able to get the Special Commodities Rider’s language incorporated into the contract – where it would continue to allow union carriers to set up non union subsidiaries. Also, Fitz and the MFCA were able to keep in the language that weakened the power of shop stewards in the terminals, and allowed shop stewards and other workers who led wildcat strikes to be fired at will by the carriers. When the National Master UPS Agreement, and the local UPS agreements in New York, Chicago, Seattle and San Francisco came up in May 1976, again Fitz let the UPS teamsters go on strike briefly – and then, after the big city UPS workers had been given a chance to “blow off some steam” by striking, Fitz rammed through all of the concessions that UPS wanted in the agreements. In UPS’s case, that meant that every UPS Teamsters contract in the US now allowed the unlimited use of part timers. This meant that the full time career teamster UPS loaders who earned the same pay as every other UPS teamster could now be replaced by college students for whom UPS was a “transitional job” – a short term source of employment to tide them over until they graduated college and went on to their real job. This was the beginning of the McDonaldsization of UPS – and was a big defeat not only for UPS workers and for teamsters but for young workers in general. The International Socialists had a front group in the UPS teamsters locals too – it was called UPSurge, and it was virtually identical to TDC. With UPS pulling down the bar, their non union competitor FedEx and their double breasted competitor Airborne Express were able to reduce hours of work, pay and benefits for the loaders at their firms as well. After the concessionary 1976-79 NMFA and National Master UPS Agreement were signed, the International Socialists merged their two teamster front groups, TDC and UPSurge, into one – Teamsters for a Democratic Union. They then set out to have a token presence at the 1976 convention – and succeeded, by getting local 299 shop steward and former Hoffa supporter Pete Camarata to take the floor at the convention. This didn’t really accomplish much – but the International Socialists thought it was a very useful public relations victory (and a good way of reaching out to “reform” local union officers – guys like Ron Carey of New York City UPS Teamsters local 804 – who the Trotskyists thought would be the key to electing a ‘reform’ leadership at the international union level in the IBT). Meanwhile, the greed of certain New York gangsters was paving the way for a full scale federal attack on organized crime in the Teamsters Union. James “Jimmy the Gent” Burke and his hijackers carried out the biggest armed robbery in the history of the world in 1978. Using information obtained from a teamster foreman with massive gambling debts, Jimmy the Gent’s crew robbed the Lufthansa Airlines freight hangar at Kennedy Airport.

They stole between $ 6 million and $ 10 million dollars worth of cash and negotiable securities from the hangar (to this day nobody knows for sure how much that haul actually was worth). Jimmy the Gent then turned around and killed almost every single person who could link him to the robbery. He’d just come home from a federal prison sentence, was still on conditional release and didn’t want to go back to jail. Also, he didn’t want to share any of that rich score with the men who actually stole it for him – Paul Vario and John Gotti got their tribute, and the thieves who did the work got killed. Starting with James “Stacks” Edwards, the crew’s sole African American member, who was killed because he didn’t destroy the trucks used in the heist (the cops found them and traced them to him) and not stopping until he’d killed every person in on the heist, including all of the thieves and even the hairdresser girlfriend of one of the robbers (who’s only offense was being questioned by the FBI – she said nothing, but got killed by Burke’s hitmen anyway). Jimmy the Gent didn’t kill the teamster foreman – who cooperated with the feds – nor did he kill longtime friend and associate Henry Hill, a Lucchese family associate who then turned around and cooperated with the feds to beat a cocaine dealing case. Hill’s testimony led to the incarceration of Jimmy the Gent and Paul Vario, and the collapse of both of their criminal organizations. The aftermath of the Lufthansa robbery not only ended the storied career of Jimmy the Gent, it also emboldened the airlines and their shippers to demand that the feds crack down on all of the other racketeers in the air freight industry. Meanwhile, the decay of the Teamsters Union continued in the freight sector – and accelerated in 1978, when President Jimmy Carter and Senator Ted Kennedy (two great “friends of labor”) proposed the deregulation of trucking. The Interstate Commerce Commission had regulated freight rates and truck routes since 1934 – President Carter and Senator Kennedy wanted to eliminate that, and let carriers pick their own routes and set their rates. This would be a windfall for the shippers – because rates would fall rapidly, and freight routes would adjust to reflect current manufacturing centers, warehouses and consumer markets. The IBT leadership didn’t have a plan to deal with this – Fitz had bet the union’s political fortune back in 1968 on continuing Republican control of the White House – but Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 and President Gerald Ford’s defeat in the 1976 elections had totally screwed up that plan. As for the International Socialists and TDU – like most of the American far left, they were closet supporters of the Democratic Party, so it was impossible for them to publicly oppose a Democratic president and the most liberal Democratic Party senator, no matter what they did to workers. Consequently, there was no real opposition to the deregulation of the trucking industry – no demonstrations, no mass rallies, no truck caravans converging on Washington, no nationwide freight strikes, nothing. There was another National Master Freight Agreement negotiated during the time the deregulation bill was being debated – the 1979-82 NMFA – but the deregulation issue didn’t even come up. Fitz didn’t raise the deregulation issue – neither did the International Socialists and TDU, nor the Naderites’ Professional Drivers Council, nor did FASH, the national steelhauler’s caucus. There was a brief national freight strike, and a slightly longer steelhaulers strike, and then, after the freighthaulers and steelhaulers had “blown off some steam”, Fitz gave the MFCA everything it wanted in the 1979-82 NMFA. The only gain for freight teamsters in that agreement was paid sick days – for the first time, freight workers could get 5 days of sick pay each year. The Special Commodities Rider language that allowed union carriers to have non union double breasted companies was still incorporated into the text of the pact, and the trucking companies still had the right to break wildcat strikes and fire the shop stewards who led them, with the full assistance of the IBT. Airborne Express and all of the other “white paper” carriers were also able to keep their substandard conditions – including Airborne’s huge non union local air freight cartage operation. They weren’t the only double breasted carrier – there were lots of others now. Sadly, neither the Trotskyists, nor the Naderites, nor the steelhaulers, made any of this mass deunionization an issue! They had fought Fitz over a few pennies more in the mileage rate, and a slightly higher hourly wage – penny ante stuff, considering the fate of the whole unionized freight sector was at stake! Meanwhile, President Carter and Senator Kennedy continued their efforts to deregulate the trucking sector – still with no coherent opposition either from the IBT leadership or the teamster dissident movement. The best the IBT leadership could do was a ham handed effort to bribe Senator Howard Cannon (D-Nevada) that only succeeded in bringing more FBI heat on the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. At least they tried – in a pathetically stupid way, but at least they tried - TDU wasn’t able to put up any kind of serious resistance at all to the Carter - Kennedy attack on America’s largest blue collar union. A union which was shrinking – by 1980, the IBT was down to 2.1 million members. Deregulation came in that year – with bipartisan support and with no meaningful organized freight worker resistance. Deregulation merely accelerated the deunionization of trucking which had begun in 1973 with Frank Fitzsimmons’ Special Commodity Rider. The trucking companies were starting to really take advantage of their NMFA sanctioned right to operate double breasted Initially, it was mainly the truckload carriers that were going double breasted, but now less than truckload (LTL) carriers were following in their footsteps. This trend accelerated after President Carter’s deregulation plan came into effect. Low rate independents and gypsies could now operate legally – and anybody with a truck could haul any load along any route at any rate without having to clear it with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Neither Fitz nor TDU nor the Professional Drivers Council had any serious plan to deal with this crisis. The best Fitz could do was returning to his old Nixon strategy of supporting the Republican Party – but when Ronald Reagan got elected president, the IBT didn’t get any real political gain for their enthusiastic support for the GOP, since Reagan was a supporter of trucking deregulation. Fitzsimmons didn’t have to worry about that though – he had more pressing personal issues – he was dying of lung cancer. Fitz left this world not long after Reagan’s inauguration – and was replaced by a former truck driver from Kansas City named Roy Williams. Williams had a tough road ahead of him – he faced a federal investigation even before he got sworn in. Williams got to negotiate his own NMFA and National UPS Master Agreement in 1982. He actually had an easier time than Fitz had ever had – the opposition was weak (even though now unified under one umbrella – TDU) and it was in the middle of the Reagan recession, so teamsters were scared for their jobs, and terrified of going on strike. UPS and the Motor Freight Carriers Association companies got whatever they wanted in their 1982-85 agreements – but that wasn’t enough. Corporate America wanted to take full advantage of the rapid fall in freight rates caused by President Carter’s deregulation program – to do that, the power of the IBT and cosa nostra had to be broken. Also, the major hotel chains who had come to dominate the Las Vegas casinos wanted to terminate their business relationships with the Central States Pension Fund and the IBT officials and cosa nostra figures who controlled those business relationships. Parallel to that, the feds were launching a crackdown on labor racketeering in New York City – and the New York City building materials Teamsters were a big part of those investigations. This caused the Chicago Outfit’s leaders to panic – and start killing potential co defendants and witnesses. One of those victims was Teamsters financial wizard Alan Dorfman, the head of the Central States Pension Fund and the financial godfather of the Las Vegas casinos, who met his death at the hands of unknown gunmen in the parking lot of a Chicago hotel. At the time of his death, Dorfman had already been removed from office by the feds, who had taken over the administration of the Central States funds. While the hoodlums were murdering each other and scrambling to stay out of prison, the men and women who’s dues paid the leases on their Cadillacs were fighting for survival. Between the recession and the Special Commodities Rider-sanctioned double breasting, it was a bad time to be a freight teamster. Ironically enough, the industry was actually expanding – the NON UNION side of the industry! Carriers were deunionizing right and left – and major less than truckload carriers like Consolidated Freightways, Yellow, Roadway, CCC, USF and NationsWay were setting up non union alter ego companies at a rapid clip (and transferring many of their clients to their double breasted subsidiaries). Non union carriers that had avoided unionization in the 30’s and 40’s like Overnite and newly formed non union firms like Central Freight were also rapidly expanding – eliminating even more union jobs. Even with all the factory workers, civil servants, brewery workers and other non drivers that Fitz and Williams had organized, the union was shrinking. Membership plummeted from 2 million to only 1.5 million in just a few years. Williams was unable to stay in office – between his failing health and the federal criminal investigation, he had to leave his post. He was replaced by, arguably, one of the most corrupt men in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (and that’s REALLY saying something!) – the notorious Jackie Presser.

Presser – as both a businessman and a labor official – sat on both side of the bargaining table. That is, when he had time to sit down at all – Presser owned a bar and a jukebox repair company, and held 10 separate full time union posts! He was the public relations director of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, IBT international vice president, chairman of the Ohio Conference of Teamsters, head of Teamsters Joint Council # 41 in Cleveland, principal officer of 4 separate Teamsters locals - and a Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees local - and a United Food and Commercial Workers supermarket clerks local! Assuming that Presser actually showed up for work at all of these jobs (an amazing feat – since some of these positions were in the Cleveland area, some were in Detroit while others were in Washington DC) he clocked an incredible 400 hours of labor each week. What a work ethic! He may not have worked all of those hours – but he sure as hell did get paid for all of them! Presser collected a jaw dropping $ 740,000 a year in combined IBT salaries, making him the highest paid union official in the history of the world. And that doesn’t include the salaries he collected from his HERE and UFCW posts – or the income he drew from his businesses. He also got 2 late model Cadillac sedans – with the gas paid for by teamster dues money – and a Gulfstream III jet - with the members picking up the tab for the 2 pilots, flight attendant, mechanic, the jet fuel and the hangars in Washington DC and in Cleveland. Unbeknownst to the Teamsters Union officers who selected him for the IBT presidency, Presser also had an 11th job – FBI informant! His compensation for that was a “get out of jail free card” – as long as he told the feds everything they wanted to know, he could continue his racketeering operations unmolested by law enforcement. One job that Presser had never held was – teamster! As a teenager, he had been a full time criminal, then, after a brief stint in the Navy, he divided his time between his bar (which was funded by Central States Pension Fund loans), his jukebox maintenance business, his union officer posts (in unions that he’d never actually been a member of), and his racketeering career – and that vocational pattern continued for the rest of Presser’s life. This was a low point for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Presser made it worse at the first IBT convention he attended as president. As had been a Teamsters convention tradition since the 1960’s (when the union permanently moved it’s conventions to Las Vegas), the 5 conferences (Canadian, Eastern, Central States, Southern and Western) held huge banquets each night - with the members picking up the tab for all the caviar, steaks, lobster, champagne (not to mention the strippers and prostitutes who were the overnight guests of the many male delegates who left their wives back home). At the Eastern Conference Banquet at the convention, Presser (who weighed over 400 pounds) had male models dressed as ancient Roman gladiators carry him into the lavish million dollar event on a Roman Emperor’s sedan chair. The astonishing thing was – nobody in attendance (other than Presser’s publicist – and the wife of a delegate who took a picture of the grotesque event and later made it available to the media) thought that there was anything wrong with this pathetic spectacle! Truck drivers losing their jobs, having to work non union – or having their mileage rates, hourly wages and benefits cut by their own union just to stay employed – but out in Las Vegas their union leaders were living lives of disgusting gluttony, at the workers expense! It’s truly unfortunate that there was no mass opposition movement in the IBT to oppose this abominable criminalized leadership. There was Teamsters for a Democratic Union, of course. TDU had gotten stronger – it had taken over Ralph Nader’s Professional Drivers Council, and with the collapse of the remains of the steelhaulers movement (the implosion of 80% of the American steel industry devastated the steelhaulers and their movement disintegrated as a result) they were the only opposition group left. Unfortunately Solidarity (the former International Socialists – they borrowed the new name from the famous Polish trade union) did not have a serious program to deal with the crisis in the industry. At a time when teamsters were looking for leadership, and would probably have followed TDU and Solidarity (a lot of teamsters respected them for taking on the gangsters) the Trotskyists were looking to find reform union leaders to follow behind, rather than taking leadership in their own hands. Solidarity and TDU had another problem – a lot of dissident teamsters had illusions that the FBI was going to save them from cosa nostra, and give the workers decent gangster-free democratic unions. This was a dangerous and deadly illusion – but Solidarity and TDU, in their rush to curry favor with reformist Teamsters local officers (many of whom did their best to aggressively encourage illusions in the FBI), did not try and explain to the teamsters the real reasons why the feds were meddling in the IBT. The government didn’t want a strong union in trucking – they wanted a weak union (or preferably no union at all) the better to reduce freight rates and trucker wages. The feds had a triple goal – break the monopoly power of the major trucking lines, bring down freight rates, and break the power of cosa nostra in trucking. To achieve those goals, the feds needed to break the pro trucking company leadership of the Teamsters Union, and replace them with a leadership that was beholden to the government, and would support the feds’ pro shipper agenda. The feds launched their attack at the Teamsters Union’s weakest point – New Jersey Joint Council # 70 and Union City Teamsters local 560, the most blatantly wiseguy ruled affiliates of the entire IBT. The Provenzanos were overthrown, Tony Pro finally got jailed, and the feds put local 560 under the control of a federal monitor. There were no tears on the loading docks of North Jersey for the Provenzanos – other than a few well connected individuals who would lose their no show or no work jobs, there weren’t any teamsters who were going to miss the Pros! A lot of people – especially the many local 560 teamsters who’s wages had been cut or who were cheated out of pension coverage or who lived in constant fear of being fired for “violating company production methods” (a warehouse industry lawyers euphemism for not working as fast as the boss wanted you to) actually welcomed FBI intervention - because they believed the feds were coming to help them! The feds had another – pro corporate – agenda, of course, but they were coming nonetheless, and this time, for the entire union. Across the river, in New York City and Long Island Joint Council # 16, the State of New York Organized Crime Task Force and the FBI were also going after the IBT. The state was targeting the commercial waste carting cartel and Teamsters local 813, while the feds, as part of a broader probe of construction labor racketeering, went after construction drivers local 282 and commercial movers local 814. There were corporate agendas involved with all of those cases. The State of New York was working in league with the nation’s three largest private waste hauling companies, Browning Ferris Industries (BFI), Waste Management, Inc (WMX) and USA Waste. They were trying to break into the New York City market – and the only thing that kept them out was the waste haulers cartel.

They needed law enforcement to break up that cartel, so they could come in and monopolize the market from the 300 small local firms that operated under cosa nostra protection. As for the probes targeting the construction unions – the city’s leading banks and real estate developers had long resented having to pay tribute to local mobsters, pay high construction prices to their contractors and to have to pay for the decent wages and benefits that union construction workers were paid. They began resenting this even more when – thanks to the deunionization of city funded housing construction – construction worker wages in the residential sector fell sharply, but prices stayed just as high as they had been when that work was unionized (the mobbed up contractors were pocketing the difference). The bankers and developers brought in the feds to break the power of the unions – which were the backbone of the cosa nostra cartels that kept construction prices and contractor profits high, at the developers and bankers expense. The US Attorney for the Southern District of New York (a very ambitious lawyer named Rudolph Giuliani) joined in this attack on cosa nostra linked unions. Giuliani filed a federal civil lawsuit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Every IBT general officer was also named as an individual – and the Genovese, Gambino, Lucchese, Bonnano and Colombo families, and the Chicago Outfit, as criminal enterprises, and the leaders of those families as individuals. None of the employers associations were mentioned in this civil racketeering suit – not even the blatantly cosa nostra dominated ones like the Metropolitan Import Truckmen’s Association, and certainly not the most powerful association in the industry, the Motor Freight Carriers Association. Nor were any of the many trucking companies who had directly benefited from IBT labor racketeering – even firms like New England Motor Freight (NEMF), who had actually bribed their way into deunionizing their drivers- were mentioned in the suit either. To the extent that trucking company management got mentioned at all, they were described as “innocent victims”! The shippers – the big corporations who were the ultimate beneficiaries of the feds intervention in the Teamsters – actually were innocent victims, in a way. After all, it was their freight being hijacked and their rates that were being pushed up thanks to the anti trust practices of cosa nostra and the trucking companies. And, of course, the biggest victims were the men and women who worked in the road freight industry – because it was their union that was being perverted and subverted. But the trucking companies were far from innocent – in particular the big carriers, who had gotten their leading positions in the industry as directly because of cosa nostra-run freight cartels. Presser began frantic negotiations with the feds – both openly through union lawyers in talks with Giuliani and through the back channel of his FBI handlers. He was seeking a settlement that would maintain his control over the union – and would avoid any kind of jail time. Presser, like his predecessor Roy Williams, had another pressing issue – a medical one.

He was dying of cancer, and he was struggling for his life as he fought the feds and cosa nostra to keep hold of the union. Between avoiding death from cancer, avoiding death from a cosa nostra hit, staying out of prison and maintaining his post as general president of the Teamsters Union, Presser had a lot on his plate. So when the two big national Teamsters Union agreements, NMFA and UPS, came up in 1985, Presser didn’t ask for very much of anything at the table. Nor did TDU put any fire under his feet – they had concerns of their own. As Trotskyists, Solidarity should have opposed the government takeover of the IBT on principle.

But, as practical opportunists, they were trying to figure out a way to put a leftist face on the FBI takeover of the union, and to actively be a participant in it, while still looking like socialists. Also, Solidarity had another problem. Like a lot of opportunist socialists, they basically believed that only college educated middle class people were capable of actually understanding socialist politics. They felt that workers were far too stupid, conservative and shortsighted to be socialists, and could only be tricked into supporting socialism by hiding socialist politics behind the cover of “good trade unionism”. Because of these basically anti working class beliefs, Solidarity been desperately trying to conceal their politics from teamsters since they started TDU back in the early 1970’s. That had actually played straight into the hands of Jackie Presser – who, as IBT PR director had always done his best to pull TDU’s Trotskyist leaders out of the closet and expose their politics to teamsters. TDU continued with this “self redbating”. They couldn’t put forward TDU’s longtime leader Ken Paff, because his socialist politics had long ago been exposed by Jackie Presser.

Nor could they put forth their most famous member, Diana Kilmury. She was the first woman construction driver in British Columbia/Yukon Territory Construction Teamsters local 155. Kilmury was famous in teamster dissident circles for heroically standing up to her local’s leadership while she was still recovering from a horrible traffic accident – and for being the only delegate at the 1984 Teamsters convention to stand up to Jackie Presser and his B.L.A.S.T.

Goons. Kilmury had a triple handicap in TDU’s views – she was a socialist, she was a Canadian and she was a woman. Solidarity pandered to the imagined sexism of male teamsters…and totally ignored the women teamsters who made up a third of the union and a majority of some of the IBT’s trade divisions (industrial teamsters, civil service, ect) – not to mention the men who would vote for a woman if she was a union militant. Kilmury was just about the only woman in her 10,000 member construction local – but they’d elected her as a convention delegate! But Solidarity’s stereotype of teamsters as sexist, racist and nationalist neanderthals who’s alleged bigotry had to be pandered to prevailed. Nor could they put any other of their leaders out there as candidates for general president – because Presser had outed them as socialists too. Also, some of the other TDU leaders had Kilmury-style “handicaps” – Solidarity felt they were unelectable because they were women, or African American, or Latino ect (again, Solidarity’s classist stereotype of White male teamsters as reactionary bigots prevailed over the far more complicated reality). And both the Hoffa movement and the steelhaulers movement had disappeared, so there was no longer a deep pool of White, male, right wing, militant shop stewards with conservative Democratic (or better yet, Republican) politics – guys like Pete Camarata - who could be put forward as respectable TDU facemen. So they had to look to reformist local union leaders – of a certain type. They couldn’t be Canadian – or African American, or Latino, or women. They couldn’t be too leftist - this left out a number of New York Teamster leaders with ties to the Communist Party USA – most notably Bill Nuchow of white collar workers local 840 and Dan Kane of Western Union telex workers local 111. But they could have a working relationship with cosa nostra – as long as it was at arm’s length (a quality that Carey, Nuchow, Kane and just about every supposedly “reformist” local officer in the IBT shared). The logical candidate (based on Solidarity’s self imposed racial, gender and politics limitations) was Ron Carey – the president of New York City UPS Teamsters local 804. Carey was White, male, an ex marine – and a registered Republican! He also had tremendous political ambition – ever since he’d gotten himself profiled as a heroic, honest, sincere and uncorruptable union officer by New York Magazine writer Steve Brill in his 1978 book “The Teamsters”, Carey had been seeking a road to the general presidency. The federal takeover would be just such a road. Carey and TDU would be a perfect match. TDU had a national organization – three of them, actually.

TDU itself, Labor Notes Magazine (another Solidarity front) and Solidarity itself. Solidarity also could draw people and resources from it’s other labor front groups – two separate organizations with the same name, New Directions (one in the United Auto Workers, the other in New York City Transport Workers Union local 100). The Trotskyists’ multi faced organization had lots of wealthy 60’s radicals on their mailing lists, a legion of millionaire limousine leftists and campus radicals turned upscale middle class professionals. Some of these upscale radicals were as famous as they were rich – like film producer Oliver Stone and rock star Frank Zappa - but even the less prominent of these high net worth socialists could back up their respectable radical politics with their ample checkbooks. And Ron Carey was the perfect faceman – cause even Jackie Presser couldn’t redbait a Republican! The feds needed both Carey and TDU – Carey as somebody with a respectable labor leadership background, and TDU because they were socialists, to make the federal takeover of the IBT look “pro labor” to the teamsters in the freight barns. Meanwhile, Presser was seeking allies. Through the good offices of local 840 chief Bill Nuchow and local 111 head Dan Kane, those same leftist New York City Teamsters officers who were too red for TDU, Presser got the public support of famed civil rights activist Jesse Jackson and, just as importantly, the private backing of the Communist Party USA. That public support and behind the scenes lobbying enabled Jackie Presser to bring the IBT back into the AFL-CIO in 1987, and to get the public endorsement (and, far more importantly, access to the government and corporate connections) of the head of the federation, Lane Kirkland. Presser and TDU’s high level politics didn’t stop the decay in the trucking terminals – the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Presser dropped the “Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America” part of the official name) was down to just 1.3 million members (a 50% decline from the glory days of the 1960’s), and was suffering a net loss of 30,000 members a year. Unionized freight truckers had a new enemy to contend with – the railroads. During the 1970’s, the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, the dominant rail carrier in the Northeast and Great Lakes States, used a buyout by the government’s Conrail system to get out of railroading (the corporation refocused to concentrate on it’s considerably more profitable big city real estate development operations). Conrail in the Northeast and Midwest – and the dominant carriers in the South (CSX, Chesapeake System, Norfolk Southern) the West (Santa Fe, Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, Burlington Northern) and Upstate New York and New England (Guilford Transportation and the Canadian National Railroad) – spun off their labor intensive passenger routes to the government owned AMTRAK system or to local transit authorities and cut all of their unprofitable freight service. On the lines that remained, they cut labor costs to the bone. They launched a coordinated nationwide offensive against their unions and their work rules – and they won. From a minimum of 5 workers (in 4 different unions) per freight train they now had 2 workers (in two different unions) on those trains, with no limit on workday, train length or mileage. The locomotive firemen, who’s job had long ago been made redundant by coal’s replacement by diesel fuel and electricity, all got laid off permanently.

Their union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, got folded into the Order of Railway Conductors. The brakemen and trainmen lost their jobs too – and the conductors had to do their car hitching and unhitching work as well as their work keeping track of the cargo.

Their union, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, dissolved too, and it’s remains joined the ORC (now renamed the United Transportation Union). The locomotive engineers kept their jobs, and their union, because somebody had to drive the train – also, locomotive engineers have to have a special federal license to drive a train, so they aren’t as interchangeable as other railroad crafts. On the platforms and in the railroad yards, they went from 8 unions to 6, work rules were gutted and the 12 hour day (and on some of the long haul lines in the Intermountain West, the 14 hour day) were restored. On some carriers, one conductor and one locomotive engineer could now do the work of 100 long haul teamsters (200 teamsters, if the carriers were using sleeper service – as many trucking companies did on long haul Intermountain West runs). The trucking companies took advantage – and with the new “piggyback” or “intermodal” service, they loaded their trailers right onto the back of railroad flatcars. Piggyback/intermodal was win win for both sets of freight bosses – and lose lose for both sets of freight workers. Every trailer on a train cost a teamster a freight run (or two teamsters in the case of the longer sleeper truck routes) – and, the railroads could replace a whole crew of a dozen or more railroad freighthandlers taking the freight off a truck box by box and putting the boxes in a boxcar with just three railroad freighthandlers – one running a crane lifting the trailer off the road and putting it on the back of a flatcar, the other two on the flatcar chaining it in place. The impact of piggyback service actually shattered the freighthandlers union. The Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks collapsed, and it’s remnants were cobbled together with the remains of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the Switchmen’s League of North America and the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen to form the Transportation Communications Union – a much weaker organization that was a lot less than the sum of it’s parts. Other than one national strike in 1978, the railroad unions were largely passive in the face of massive attacks on themselves and their members. Piggyback service not only helped break the railroad unions, it also began to seriously cut into teamster employment. Presser really wasn’t in a position to do anything about that – or to fight for the two largest groups of members he directly bargained for, the 200,000 workers left under the National Master Freight Agreement and the 130,000 UPS teamsters, who’s pacts came up in the spring of 1988. The freight workers got a mediocre NMFA, with the same critical flaws as every NMFA since 1973. The UPS part timers really got screwed in their agreement. Presser agreed to freeze starting pay for part timers at $ 8.50 an hour, while full timers would see their starting rate increase. That was a permanent starting pay freeze – and, to this day, 21 years and a lot of cost of living increases later, UPS part timers start at $ 8.50/hr. UPS also got the right to use lower paid workers – air express drivers – for certain types of delivery work.

Some of these air express drivers were actually part timers – the first time UPS had been allowed to use part timers for driving work. One of the reason the freight agreement was subpar, and the UPS agreement was an outright betrayal of the part timers, was Presser’s increasingly critical situation. He absentmindedly negotiated those contracts between high level summit meetings with politicians, union chiefs and the feds and frequent trips to the Cleveland Clinic for chemotherapy and radiation treatment for his inoperable brain tumor. Presser ended up dying shortly thereafter, replaced as general president by one Weldon Mathis, the general secretary treasurer. Mathis was a career business agent from Atlanta Teamsters local 728. He had only briefly worked as a teamster before becoming a full time union officer in 1950, and, in typical IBT leader fashion, he handed his local over to his sons when he advanced to higher office. Mathis even split off part of the local to create local 528, so both of his sons could have local unions of their very own! Needless to say, nobody bothered to ask Georgia teamsters their opinion on that! The only major “highlight” of the Mathis administration in local 728 was his good old boy-based leadership’s role in sabotaging the joint UAW-IBT African American workers organizing drive back in 1968. Mathis time in the general president’s chair was very brief – he was quickly ousted by Salvatore “Sammy Pro” Provenzano and Joseph “Joe T” Trerotola, who wanted an Eastern Conference guy with stronger cosa nostra ties in the presidency. They picked Billy McCarthy from Boston Teamsters local 25. McCarthy was a former freight driver – and made history as the first actual freight industry worker to serve as IBT general president. He’d been a business agent for many years, and had close ties with the wiseguys – both Boston’s Irish organized crime family, the cosa nostra families in Providence, Rhode Island and New York City and the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. He resumed Presser’s negotiations with Giuliani – talks that became far more urgent with the arrest of Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno. Fat Tony was the owner of S & A Concrete, a major hirise concrete contractor in New York City.

He was also the underboss of the Genovese crime family, and in that latter capacity he was responsible for negotiating all major disputes in construction and trucking in New York City, and for broader labor and union governance issues related to the Teamsters and the building trades. These high level discussions, involving billion dollar industries and the work lives of a couple of million people, were held in the back room of Fat Tony’s other business, a pizzeria in Manhattan’s East Harlem neighborhood. Fat Tony’s arrest put the entire leadership of Teamsters Joint Councils # 16 and # 70 and the Eastern Conference of Teamsters at risk of arrest – and if they went, the IBT’s international leadership’s arrests would almost immediately follow. This forced McCarthy to settle with Giuliani, more or less on the US Attorney’s terms – putting the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under government supervision. The already existing federal trusteeships of the Central States Pension Fund and New Jersey Teamsters local 560 would continue separately. But the rest of the IBT would be supervised by a judge in the federal Southern District of New York, assisted by a court appointed Special Master and a three person panel that would serve as the highest judicial body in the IBT, with the power to expel any person from the union for cosa nostra ties or other major criminal activity. And, every major decision of the IBT leadership – with the exception of organizing, bargaining and strikes – would have to be approved by that federal judge. The cost of the federal supervision of the union would be completely funded by the IBT general fund. The feds also wanted to build a leadership that would support their efforts to break up the local trucking and construction cartels, and would break up the dominant positions that the leading less than truckload carriers still held in the freighthauling industry. The current Teamsters Union leadership, with their ties to the trucking companies and cosa nostra, would not be willing, or even able, to accomplish this task. So the feds wanted a whole new leadership, who would be beholden to the feds rather than to trucking company management. They planned to install this leadership through the means of a one member one vote general election for the union’s top leadership posts. This was a great democratic innovation (especially in light of the fact that of all of America’s unions only two, the United Steel Workers of America and the United Mine Workers of America, elect their general officers – every other union has their top officials appointed by general convention delegates). But, as we will see below, the feds severely miscalculated in their assumption that a democratically elected Teamsters Union leadership would be able to go against the dominant IBT employers. The feds didn’t grasp a basic reality of North American unions – and this mistake would cripple almost all of the government’s efforts at regime change in the craft unions. The social base of the leaderships of those unions was in a narrow privileged layer of workers with strong ties to the bosses in those industries. In the case of the Teamsters, where, due to the existence of a large class of owner operators, there was a large overlap between trucking company management and the most privileged layers of truck drivers, there was an even stronger tie between the employers and union leaders. Even if those leaders were subject to election, that privileged layer of teamsters would still dominate the union, in the absence of a mass movement of the less privileged teamsters - employee drivers, dockworkers and warehouse workers. Since the feds had no intention of building a mass movement on the loading docks (they were as terrified of that as the trucking companies, the IBT leadership and the leaders of TDU and Solidarity were!) it was impossible for them to build a stable pro federal leadership in the IBT. Neither the feds nor TDU understood that at the time.

TDU didn’t want to build a mass movement either. This was partly because of Solidarity’s elitist contempt for the intellectual capacities of blue collar workers in general and freight teamsters in particular. It was also partly because of Solidarity’s fear that an independent mass movement of those dumb uneducated blue collar workers that was not carefully controlled by smart well educated responsible middle class people like them might get too radical and might challenge the system in irresponsible and revolutionary ways. One of the late Jackie Presser’s most effective public relations attacks against TDU – and the one that still resonates with many freighthaulers to this very day - was his claim that TDU and it’s leaders were corporate funded outsiders trying to meddle in the internal affairs of a blue collar union. It was an effective charge because it was basically true! TDU was funded by a mix of corporate foundation grants and donations from rich leftists – dues colleted from the group’s alleged “10,000 members” were a very small part of their income. TDU’s leadership looked at the federal takeover as an opportunity to become the behind the scenes ruling party of the Teamsters Union, without having to actually build a mass movement of workers as a power base – basically, it was a get rich quick scheme, built on the weak and unstable foundation of a federal court order. Unfortunately for Teamsters for a Democratic Union, this get rich quick scheme was ultimately doomed to failure. It probably didn’t seem that way at the time. Judge David Edelstein – the federal judge who Giuliani’s consent decree had placed as final arbiter on all Teamsters Union policy decisions – seemed to be on their side, even going so far as to picking a pro TDU candidate as Elections Officer - a left wing lawyer with ties to Solidarity, Barbara Zack Quindel. Even then, there was a problem with the wealthy non teamster donors. Specifically, film producer Oliver Stone’s donations were a problem – because he was an employer, and the National Labor Relations Act forbids employers to be part of union elections in any capacity. Making matters worse, he was a teamster employer – he had members of Teamsters locals 25, 399 and 817 working for his production company. The officers of those locals happened to be vocal TDU opponents. In other words, not only was Stone directly meddling in the internal affairs of a union that represented some of his employees, he was also supporting political opponents of the union officials who directly represented his workers. This made Stone’s donation a serious violation – but, thanks to Quindel’s intervention, all TDU had to do was return Stone’s check. This was a natural consequence of TDU’s lack of a social base among actual teamsters – and was foreshadowing for future problems. Meanwhile, the Teamsters Union leadership were divided into several hostile camps, preventing a unified opposition to the pro TDU forces. McCarthy was unable to get a campaign organized – and ended up being a lame duck who would leave office no matter who won the election. McCarthy also faced electoral opposition from a Carey/TDU candidate in his own local – George Cashman. Cashman ended up defeating McCarthy. Not that it mattered much for the members – Cashman the “reformer” had ties of his own to Irish organized crime and to the Hells Angels, just like McCarthy did, and he was soon giving the local’s best construction and motion picture driver jobs to wiseguys and gangbangers, just as his predecessors always had. James P.

“Junior” Hoffa – the logical opposition candidate – was barred from the race, because he wasn’t an actual teamster (he was a lawyer in private practice who represented several Detroit-area IBT locals – including the local his dad founded, local 337). Lacking Hoffa’s name on the ballot, the IBT leadership were divided between Walter Shea (Joe T’s successor as head of the Eastern Conference) and R.

V. Durham, the head of North Carolina Teamsters local 391. Although they both had solid support from local officers in their home conferences (and Durham had the behind the scenes support of the Communist Party, USA and several CP led locals in New York City), the leaders of Western and Central States were divided. Also, many Teamsters Union officers were very busy defending themselves against the new Independent Review Board – which was rapidly clearing house and kicking out IBT leaders with blatant cosa nostra ties. Keeping their salaries and their Lincoln Town Cars – not to mention staying out of prison – was a lot more important for these guys than campaigning! TDU’s candidate, Ron Carey, had support from many of the UPS locals – and, of course, from the feds. Solidarity and TDU had imported a number of professional union activists from the staffs of other unions (most notably the United Mine Workers of America – who’s leaders had also been installed by the feds, back in 1975) and from the world of left wing activism. None of those folks had ever been teamsters – or coal miners, for that matter. Most teamsters supported “none of the above” and were barely involved in the election (many factory worker teamsters were barely aware there WAS an election – since their locals had always been on the fringes of Teamsters politics anyway). There were actual labor struggles going on that distracted the members from the balloting – the UPS agreement and NMFA were both up for negotiation during the campaign (and neither McCarthy nor Durham nor Shea nor Carey/TDU had any real plan to fight back against all the years of givebacks to the freight carriers) Shea and Durham cancelled each other out, and Carey won by a plurality in December 1991, becoming the first directly elected Teamsters Union general president – and the first UPS driver to hold that post. And 80% of teamsters didn’t even bother to return their mail ballot – silently rejecting all three candidates. Carey was sworn into office in February 1992.

He immediately fired most of the staff at IBT headquarters, bringing in the leftists and ex UMWA staff who had worked on his campaign as their replacements. He also changed the name of the union’s bimonthly propaganda sheet magazine from the International Teamster to the New Teamster. It was still a propaganda sheet, written by professional public relations people rather than Teamsters Union officers and activists or legitimate labor journalists and it still had no independent news coverage or analysis of Teamsters events or freight industry news. Carey just fired the Republican Party PR people (many of whom were Presser-era holdovers) who used to write the magazine’s lying puff piece articles and brought in Democratic Party PR people – to write lying puff piece articles. Carey also continued the practice of having all of the magazine’s content in English, with no articles in French or Spanish (despite the IBT’s many French Canadian and Latino members – some of whom were more comfortable reading articles written in their native languages). Judge Edelstein and the Independent Review Board, who published bimonthly reports to the members in the magazine, didn’t feel the need to translate their articles into Spanish or French either. Carey inherited a union that was rapidly shrinking – it was down to 1.3 million members when he came into office (only 180,000 of whom worked in freight – a 20,000 worker loss in just 3 years!). His first acts were budgetary – reducing expenses to reflect the reality of a shrunken union.

The 7 Gulfstream executive jets were sold, and their crews laid off and many of the Cadillacs and Lincolns got sold as well. Staff salaries were reduced and many no show or no work “general organizer” jobs were eliminated as well. Carey also disbanded 4 of the Conferences – the Eastern, Central States, Southern and Western Conferences were all dissolved, with only the Canadian Conference remaining as an autonomous body. This was also presented as a budgetary measure – but Carey’s disbanding of the conferences had more to do with the fact that the majority of local union leaders n the IBT were Carey opponents, and the Conferences were rival centers of power in the union that could be used against his administration. It also removed a major financial resource from his opponents – the second or third salaries that many local officers received from Area Conference payrolls were taken away at one fell swoop. Carey now was able to face the problem of a shrinking union – in a growing industry. The road freight business was rapidly expanding – as were the closely related small package and air freight industries. In road freight alone there were 2 million workers – only 180,000 of whom were members of the Teamsters Union. He – and TDU – both knew that the solution was organizing, but they were not prepared to launch the kind of sweeping 1930’s style organizing drives that would be necessary to revive the union. Launching a mass movement of truck drivers was dangerous – it would bring tens of thousands of militant workers (and hundreds of militant workplace leaders) into the union, and it would antagonize the feds, who wanted to reduce the standard of living of truckers, not increase it! But not organizing pretty much guaranteed that the union carriers would continue to deunionize just to stay in business, and guaranteed the eventual extinction of the Teamsters Union as a freight drivers organization. Even UPS was in danger of deunionizing!

The biggest teamster employer had a non union subsidiary, UPS Logistics, and a huge non union white collar workforce – and the non union side of the company was growing faster than the union side. So, to deal with this crisis, Carey launched some very limited organizing drives. The Teamsters Union’s Organizing Department approached a number of activist FedEx workers (some of whom were veterans of a failed United Auto Workers organizing drive in Philadelphia) and put together a small scale FedEx organizing campaign (big enough to be noticed, but too small to seriously threaten the # 2 small package carrier in the nation with unionization). The Organizing Department also approached George Cashman – the pro Carey gangster unionist from Boston – about setting up a Port Drivers department. Cashman – who had strong ties with the South Boston Irish wiseguys and Hells Angels gangbangers who controlled the Boston waterfront – agreed to lead a drive to reunionize the port truckers the union had abandoned in the 1980’s. He also agreed to get paid a 5th salary – on top of the other 4 six figure salaries he drew as president of Boston Teamsters local 25, president of Joint Council # 10, international vice president of the IBT and part time MASSPORT (Massachusetts Port Authority) board member – for this job. Cashman’s 5th job brought his compensation up to almost Jackie Presserian levels – over $ 600,000 a year, plus expense accounts, a Lincoln Town Car and a no show job for his mistress on the payroll of the Local 25 benefits fund. Cashman didn’t organize the port truckers in his own back yard, Boston Harbor. After all, he didn’t want to offend his fellow MASSPORT board members - or the shipping lines and stevedoring contractors they answered to - or the Hells Angels and the Irish mob that stood behind the stevedoring contractors – so that was out of the question. Nor did he approach Teamsters local 805 on the Brooklyn waterfront or local 560 across the river on the New Jersey waterfront – because the feds were busy taking over those locals from the Genoveses. But he did approach a group of radical Latino drivers in the Port of Los Angeles (led by militant CPA Ernesto Jesus “Ernie” Navarez…yes, you read right, a radical tax accountant!) who had been involved in a failed Communications Workers of America port truckers organizing drive in 1988. The LA port truckers hadn’t failed in 1988 – they’d been abandoned by the CWA, who had launched a massive Latino workers organizing campaign in LA two years earlier. Overnight, and without warning, the CWA cut it’s losses, went back to it’s core jurisdiction (telephone company workers) and pulled out of Southern California, abandoning tens of thousands of militant Latino workers who had looked to them for leadership, including the LA harbor port truckers. These LA truckers were ready, willing and able to organize when Cashman and the IBT came to them in 1992. The Teamsters Unions lawyers (and the feds, who were always looking over their shoulders) were NOT ready, willing or able – they were terrified of a port truckers strike, and used the excuse of a possible anti trust lawsuit, because the port truckers were owner operator drivers who used their own trucks to haul the port trucking carriers’ chassis and the steamship lines’ sea freight containers. This anti trust excuse was used to delay port trucker organizing for many years. Carey also launched a freight organizing drive – kindasorta. Instead of a national drive targeting the entire industry – in particular carriers on the rapidly growing Laredo, Texas to Chicago route, and the non union subsidiaries of Consolidated Freightways, Yellow, Roadway, US Freightways, NationsWay and UPS - Carey went after two small companies instead. One was Overnite Transportation (OVNT). The Memphis-based less than truckload carrier had managed to avoid unionization during Hoffa’s Southern organizing drive in the 1950’s, mainly because OVNT was a paternalistic family-owned firm that had close to Teamsters Union wage levels and good working conditions. But, in the late 1980’s, the descendents of the original owners decided to cash out – they sold the company to Union Pacific Railroad. Union Pacific, flush with cash from it’s profitable Chicago to California piggyback service, wanted to be a full service door to door intermodal logistics firm, instead of just a railroad. Having their own non union LTL trucking company was part of that plan. Union Pacific junked the near NMFA pay scales, gutted the benefits, and, most angry-making for the 10,000 OVNT workers, imposed brutal Union Pacific-style labor relations at the relaxed, family oriented southern trucking company. Workers who had hated or feared the Teamsters Union for decades flocked to the IBT. Over 1,000 of the firm’s 10,000 drivers, dockworkers, secretaries, mechanics and security guards joined the IBT organizing committees – and over 4,000 more were willing to sign authorization cards. This kind of pro union groundswell is unheard of in modern union organizing – as a result, the OVNT organizing drive was far and away the most successful Carey era organizing drive. At least at first. Then UPRR put the hammer down. Union Pacific set up what can only be described as a private terrorist group – called OVNT SWAT – in all 130 of it’s US terminals. The OVNT SWAT thugs operated with impunity (the tech-savvy goons even had their own website, and bragged about their vile deeds on truck drivers websites like TeamsterNet and Freighthaulers!) – especially at the company’s home terminal in Memphis. The pattern was a group of OVNT SWAT thugs would single out a pro union worker, beat him or her up, and then OVNT managers would fire the victimized worker on the spot for “fighting at work” – while leaving the OVNT SWAT goons unpunished! In one case, a middle aged female dockworker at Memphis was followed into the ladies room by 4 male OVNT SWAT goons, had her arm broken – and then got fired before she could even get to the emergency room! Union Pacific fired over 2,000 pro union workers in this campaign of blatant, in-your-face union busting terrorism. The Teamsters Union’s response? Nothing. The IBT’s lawyers did write lots of letters, and file lots of unfair labor practice complaints with the National Labor Relations Board, and did do their best to represent the fired workers in court. But that was about it. There was no mass picketing at OVNT terminals and no attempts to get teamsters to refuse to handle freight inbound to or outbound from the OVNT system. The union didn’t picket Union Pacific freight yards – and teamsters continued hauling freight into and out of the UPRR rail system as if nothing was happening. No attempt was made to ask the railroad unions to call a sympathy strike against the UPRR system.

There was no resistance on the ground, and the OVNT freight workers were left to twist slowly in the wind by themselves. The IBT organizers surrendered the loading docks of Overnite Transportation to the thugs of OVNT SWAT without any organized fightback whatsoever. One of the largest intermodal freight companies in the United States set up what was basically a high tech North American version of a Colombian death squad, and the Teamsters did nothing to stop them! This taught a very harsh lesson – to freight workers in general, and OVNT workers in particular. Carey’s Overnite organizing drive still continued – on paper – but on the ground it was a dismal failure. And 2,000 freight workers paid the price – 20% of the potential bargaining unit lost their jobs. Carey’s other truck drivers organizing campaign was at Pony Express. That carrier – a subsidiary of Borg Warner security – mainly carried cancelled checks, and other financial documents. The Pony Express campaign was about as successful as the OVNT organizing drive – initially, the IBT got a lot of worker support, and then Borg Warner began an anti union campaign and a lot of pro union workers got fired. The IBT responded with a very ineffective strike, a lot of NLRB complaints and a “corporate campaign” – basically, an effort to embarrass Borg Warner’s clients into pressuring the company to sign a contract with the IBT. It did not work – and the Pony Express organizing campaign was a flop. Meanwhile, there was yet another attack on freight workers – the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Canada. One of the clauses in FTA allowed Canadian trucking companies (and the Canadian subsidiaries of US carriers) to use Canadian trucks and drivers – getting Canadian mileage rates – to haul to any destination in the Continental United States or Alaska Since most Canadian truckers were non union – and even union Canadian carriers generally paid lower rates than their US counterparts - this was yet another blow to union drivers in the US. But the Carey administration did very little about this – and they certainly didn’t launch a frantic PR campaign against “dangerous Canadian truckers”. As we’ll see below, this is totally different than their response to the Mexican truckers issue just two years later. Unionized freight workers were still in a crisis, and the defeat of the Overnite organizing drive and the Canadian FTA made things even worse. But the Carey administration had other priorities – in particular, supporting the FBI’s purge of cosa nostra-linked officials in Teamsters locals all over the country - in particular in New York City. Numerous cosa nostra linked IBT officers were expelled from the union – including “Chuckie” O’Brien, Jimmy Hoffa’s foster son and a longtime IBT “organizer” (who was allegedly involved in his disappearance and murder). Among the New York City locals aggressively cleaned out were the city’s two freight locals – Brooklyn, Queens and Long Island based local 707 and the Manhattan and Bronx based local 807, which also represented the city’s trade show teamsters. Construction drivers local 282 also had widespread expulsions – not only of local officers but of several working teamster foremen on the jobsites. The other IBT construction-related locals in New York City, lumber yard workers locals 554 and 1205 and movers local 814 also had their officers purged as well, as did private sanitation workers local 813. The grotesquely corrupt air freight locals 295 and 858 also had their officers purged as did the waterfront drivers local 805 and Hunts Point Terminal Market local 202. The local 202 takeover gave Carey an opportunity to put out an olive branch to the Communist Party, USA run Teamsters locals in the city. Carey gave local 202 to Danny Kane, the son of Western Union telex workers local 111 chief Dan Kane, one of the leading CPUSA-linked Teamsters officers. Kane the younger had never actually had a job at the Hunts Point market, of course – he was a former amateur boxer. Danny wasn’t even a teamster when he was given control of local 202, which he became a member of shortly before he was appointed it’s president! To add insult to injury, Kane the younger was yet another White president for a local that had long been majority African American and Latino. At least one local was outright disbanded. Funeral home workers and barrel factory workers local 1034, run by Bernard Adelstein, the gangster who controlled the notoriously cosa nostra dominated local 813, the private sanitation workers local, basically functioned as an insurance fraud scheme and was not a real trade union. Most of local 1034’s “members” were the relatives of cosa nostra-linked funeral home operators, barrel factory owners and restaurateurs.

The actual workers in those businesses were not allowed to join local 1034 – only relatives of the business owners, who were given health coverage that was denied to the nominally “union” workers. Among those expelled were leading Teamster wiseguys. Like the Genovese family’s “Matty the Horse” Ianello (who went over to his rackets in Amalgamated Transit Union local 1181, which represents the city’s 15,000 public school bus drivers – a racket he continued until his 2007 racketeering arrest). And the Colombo family’s William “Wild Bill” Cutolo, who shifted his focus to his rackets in District Council 37 of AFSCME, the city workers union. “Wild Bill” only lasted a few more years – he disappeared in 1999 and was almost certainly killed in a mob hit and secretly buried. Bernard Adelstein was banned for life from the Teamsters Union - effectively ending his racketeering career. Even non mobbed up New York City Teamsters Union officers got kicked out – like Barry Feinstein, the president of City Employees Union local 237, who was basically kicked out for his Jackie Presser-like millionaire’s lifestyle rather than any criminal conduct (he made a soft landing at the New York City Central Labor Council where he was hired to run it’s Consortium for Workers Education, a vocational education program serving union members and underprivileged youth). All of these locals had pro Carey administrations installed in place of the old cosa nostra dominated regimes. Similar, smaller scale, purges were carried out in New Jersey, Chicago, St Louis, Ohio and Southern California – again, replacing wiseguys with Carey supporters. This did not necessarily improve things for teamsters. In local 813, the New York City private sanitation local, the main beneficiaries were the big three national waste haulers – BFI, WMX and Allied – who were now able to enter the New York market. This led to 30% price cuts for buildings owned by big real estate developers, 40% price increases for small business owners, and the end of an industrywide union contract for the industry’s 3,000 teamsters and 3,000 Laborers Union members. Also, about 1,000 teamsters and 1,000 laborers lost their jobs when many of the 300 independent waste haulers were driven out of business by the big three. The federal cleanup of local 282 – while removing many wiseguys from the local – also destroyed the working teamster foreman system. General Contractors were allowed to get rid of teamster foremen on all but their biggest jobs - only jobs worth $ 5 million or more now required a teamster foreman. In practice, that meant that they were now free to let their subcontractors use non union trucks on those smaller jobs. In the long run, the newly installed pro Carey officers didn’t really help Carey that much – it only won him distrust from other Teamsters Union local officers. More importantly, it alienated the carriers – which was very important, considering that the privileged owner operator drivers had always been the social base of IBT leadership from the very beginning. Those drivers with close ties to management were very suspicious of the feds, feeling - with good reason – that the government’s objective was to weaken the carriers. The New York City waste haulers case showed that clearly – the City of New York, aided by Carey and the feds, basically crushed the small independent waste hauling companies, on behalf of the big three national waste haulers and the big real estate interests. Carriers – and the privileged layer of pro company drivers – felt, correctly, that this is what the feds planned for the entire freight industry. The many “old guard” IBT officers who came from that social background – plus the officers who were mob guys, felt – correctly – that Carey and TDU were allied with this effort to break the will of the freight carriers on behalf of Corporate America and the feds. The carriers, the better off and more privileged layers of drivers, the old guard union officers, the gangsters and Junior Hoffa were being united by the FBI/Carey/ TDU attacks on them. Carey, TDU and the feds were crippled in opposing this growing opposition precisely because of their LACK of a solid social base among teamsters. TDU had long since ceased to be a mass dissident organization – most of it’s chapters were small groups of aspiring union officers, and in some areas, where federal removals of old guard officials had catapulted TDU members into local union office, TDU had basically ceased to exist. TDU nationally was largely funded by foundation grants and donations from well to do non teamster leftists – it’s ties to militant trucking terminal shop stewards (the historic backbone of the Teamsters Union dissident movement) were all but gone. Carey had even less of a social base – he had widespread support among the more privileged layer of UPS workers (full time feeder drivers and package car drivers) but that was about it. Even in UPS, the army of young college student part timers – temporary teamsters who on average quit or lost their jobs due to injury after only 4 months on the job, and who were 49% of UPS’ workforce – were basically politically inert, since UPS was nothing more than a transitional job to pay their way to education and future white collar professional employment. To them, the IBT was just another payroll deduction on their tiny paychecks. Paychecks that were proportionately smaller than they had been in years past – thanks to Jackie Presser’s 1988 betrayal, most of these workers only made $ 8.50/hr – and few of them stuck around long enough to get full teamster pay. Outside of UPS, there was a narrow layer of freight drivers – many of them veterans of past struggles – who still believed in TDU and therefore supported Carey. As for the rest of the union? Many IBT members in factories and the civil service sector shared the UPS part timers view that the Teamsters Union was just another deduction on the paycheck, and involvement in the political struggles in the union was minimal at best. This was especially true of the many Latino factory workers who were left out of the loop by the fact that neither the Hoffaites nor Carey and TDU nor the official IBT had any of their propaganda material in Spanish. Even if bilingual literature had been available, there was the cold hard fact that many industrial teamsters ESPECIALLY in the New York City factory worker locals (210, 240, 808, 810 and 966) worked in low wage sweatshops that were often “union” in name only. For these teamsters, all the rhetoric about “taking back our union” was just so much hot air. Supermarket warehouse teamsters, at 600,000 workers the largest craft in the IBT, were also largely absent from the IBT political world. The tyranny of “methods” and rampant union sanctioned firing of teamsters who worked “too slow” had made many warehouses hellish places to work, where the bosses used the latest in electronic surveillance to make sure every worker on the floor handled at least 5,000 pounds of groceries a day. The privileged layer of supermarket warehouse workers – the drivers – faced attacks of their own. Many supermarkets were aggressively contracting out their grocery hauling work to non union trucking subcontractors – or, worse yet, UNION trucking subcontractors with lower pay scales and grossly substandard conditions. This deterioration had actually accelerated since Carey came to power – so these workers had no reason to support Carey. Basically, Carey had a very thin base of support, Junior Hoffa had a much wider base (and one with solid ties to the carriers) - but even Hoffa’s base was a small minority of teamsters. Most teamsters basically sat out the conflict, since their conditions were unlikely to improve no matter which one held the general presidency. It was in this climate that Carey decided to launch a national freight strike in 1994. Well, calling it a “national freight strike” is kind of overstating matters. Carey only called out 40,000 freight teamsters who worked for the unionized parts of 4 less than truckload carriers – Consolidated Freightways, Yellow, Roadway and Arkansas Best Freight (ABF). The 140,000 teamsters who worked for the rest of the LTL carriers, the truckload carriers and Airborne Express stayed on the road. And, of course, the 1.8 million non union drivers were still on the road too. And all the Canadian drivers – union and non union – who could now haul freight to and from US destinations in 49 states, thanks to the 1992 Free Trade Agreement – were still on the road as well. Consequently, this “national strike” had almost no impact on the economy – unlike the 1970 wildcat strike, which crippled much of American heavy industry for over a month and shut down the nation’s largest seaport, the Port of Los Angeles. Carey also didn’t touch the double breasting issue – even though CF, Yellow and Roadway were all massively double breasted (CF’s non union Con Way divisions actually hauled more freight than the parent company). The main issue of the strike was piggybacking – the hauling of truck trailers by railroads. The carriers eventually agreed to a loophole filled “ban” on railhauling trailers – with an elaborate compensation system set up to pay “runaround pay” to drivers who would have worked if their freight had not been put on a train. In a real way, instead of banning piggybacking, the 1994-97 NMFA institutionalized the practice! The compensation system guaranteed that higher seniority road drivers and sleeper team drivers would not protest the system, because they would get money in their pocket every time a trailer got piggybacked. Meanwhile, Carey settled the 1994-97 National Master UPS Agreement, who’s only notable feature was a “innocent until proven guilty” clause – a first in a private sector contract in the American labor movement – stating that UPS couldn’t fire a worker until that firing had been upheld by an arbitrator. The customary practice in American union contracts is for the boss to have the right to fire a worker for any reason – and the worker and the union have the right to file a grievance if they think the firing is unjust. The termination then goes through a multi step grievance procedure – and even if the company was totally in violation of the contract, the worker doesn’t get his/her job back for months or even years. Under the 1994-97 National Master UPS Agreement, the firing went to arbitration first – and the worker kept his/her job while the grievance made it’s way through the arbitration process. This was a much fairer system for workers – and it’s truly unfortunate that no other union has followed the Teamsters Union’s lead on this (not even other IBT contracts have this clause!) Meanwhile, the US, Canadian and Mexican governments signed NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. One of it’s sections extended to Mexican trucking companies – and the Mexican subsidiaries of American carriers – the right to haul freight in 48 American states and let American carriers haul freight in all 31 Mexican states. This basically extended the same rights to Mexican trucking companies that their Canadian counterparts had won 2 years earlier. Carey – who had let the US Canadian FTA go by almost unnoticed – screamed blue bloody murder about NAFTA. There was a lot of overheated and often flat out racist rhetoric about “unsafe” Mexican drivers and trucks marauding across American roads. Lost in all the hot air was the fact that few Mexican carriers would be able to haul in the US for insurance reasons. Mexico has a very different legal system than America. Here, traffic accidents are dealt with by the civil courts, and are usually resolved by lawsuits and insurance company payouts. In Mexico, traffic accidents are a criminal court matter – with the full weight of the Mexican police falling on the individual truck driver, with the trucking company all but immune to any civil or criminal legal sanction. Because of this Mexican trucking companies are not nearly as well insured as their American or Canadian counterparts – they don’t have to budget for lawyers fees and insurance premiums when setting their freight rates, like their counterparts north of the border do. Accidents are a lot cheaper for Mexican trucking companies than they are for US or Canadian carriers, since it’s simply a question of some hapless driver going to jail for a couple of years with the only actual cost to the carrier being a modest fine or a bribe to a police official to get the truck and it’s load out of impound. Due to this big transportation law difference, it’s actually easier for well insured American carriers to haul in Mexico (even if they are using American drivers who are being paid American mileage rates) than for underinsured Mexican carriers to haul into the United States of America. The IBT’s research department and it’s legal staff knew all of this. But that didn’t stop the Carey administration from launching a racist lobbying campaign against NAFTA. Teamsters for a Democratic Union and Solidarity uncritically supported Carey’s racebaiting of the Mexican truckers (as did Solidarity’s other labor front groups, Labor Notes Magazine, UAW New Directions and TWU New Directions). As Trotskyists, they should have opposed Carey on principle – socialists are supposed to believe in working class internationalism, after all. But Solidarity and it’s front groups as a rule had never let a little thing like basic Marxist principles get in the way of their uncritical support of Carey on every issue, big and small, so why would they make an exception here? Carey succeeded in getting Congress to block the handful of Mexican trucking companies that were US insurance law compliant from hauling into the US beyond the border zone set by the 1965 US Mexico treaty – 20 miles into Arizona, California and New Mexico, 75 miles into Arizona. Ironically enough, the Mexican trucking industry is far more heavily unionized than it’s US counterpart (27% south of the Rio Grande – 5% north of it) – so you had the sad spectacle of the Teamsters Union attacking unionized Mexican drivers on behalf of non union American trucking companies! To add to the irony – the Mexican union truckers who regularly haul Mexican made factory goods across the border to American trucking terminals in the 1965 border zone actually make about the same mileage rate as their non union US counterparts! Beyond the racial shenanigans with the Mexican truckers, Carey still faced a political crisis – his administration had a very narrow social base among the members, and he was unable to consolidate his position. He wasn’t even able to get the Teamsters general convention to formally enact the amendments to the IBT constitution that had been mandated by Judge Edelstein. Carey couldn’t even accomplish the modest goal of giving the union a less sexist name (Carey’s gender neutral “Teamsters International Union” was rejected – the delegates decided to keep “International Brotherhood of Teamsters” as the union’s official name – even though it overlooked the 400,000 sisters in the brotherhood). Meanwhile, Junior Hoffa had gotten one of the clients of his law firm - Teamsters local 337, a Detroit-area supermarket warehouse local founded by his dad – to hire him as a secretary. The point of his demotion from lawyer to clerical worker was very simple. As a self-employed attorney who owned his own firm, he was not a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and could not run for any union office. But as an office worker at an IBT local union, he would be eligible for union membership – and with official Teamsters Union membership Hoffa would be legally able to run for general president in 1996. Hoffa also began reaching out for support – from local union officers, the trucking companies and the transportation industry media.

All of these groups were looking forward to a Junior Hoffa administration. Although only the union officials could actually give cash donations, the political support from the carriers, and the good coverage in Traffic World, the Journal of Commerce and the rest of the freight industry trade press (which generated even more trucking company political support) was incredibly valuable for Junior. Carey also began preparing for the 1996 race. He had a very narrow base among teamsters – the backbone of Carey’s support came from the AFL-CIO leadership, the Clinton administration, the hierarchy of the Democratic Party and middle class liberals, all of whom saw a pro Democratic leadership in the Teamsters as a major part of their goal to take back control of congress for the Democrats in 1996. Since very few actual teamsters were going to be donating money to Carey or TDU, they had to come up with a way to finance his reelection campaign. An elaborate scheme was set up where Carey would have the IBT donate money to liberal groups, who would in turn make donations to Carey’s reelection campaign. It amounted to money laundering – and Carey, unlike his wiseguy predecessors, wasn’t very well versed in the fine art of camouflaging the source of his cash. The feds – who desperately wanted Carey to win reelection – basically looked the other way while this scheme happened. It greatly helped that the federal lawyer in charge of monitoring Teamsters Union elections was Barbara Zach Quindel – a leftist Wisconsin attorney with ties to TDU and it’s parent organization, Solidarity. She had been in charge of the 1991 general elections and had bent over backwards then for Carey and TDU – which she continued to do in the 1996 elections. Carey narrowly won that election – he overwhelmingly carried the minority of UPS workers who actually voted, split the minority of freight and carhaul members who voted with Hoffa and lost all the other divisions. Carey had ran on his record – and Hoffa ran on a promise to basically abandon any effort to re unionize the freight industry and to focus on rebuilding the Teamsters as a union of UPS workers, hospital workers and public employees. As in 1991, over 80% of teamsters didn’t bother to vote for either candidate. This was despite lots of direct mail and telemarketing appeals from the Carey camp – paid for by laundered union funds. Hoffa immediately went to court to appeal the election – citing Carey’s money laundering, which he and his lawyers had easily discovered. Carey and his Democratic Party backers were very very incompetent when it came to money laundering (in one case, Carey literally forced an IBT bookkeeper to write a $ 400,000 check to a pro Democratic Party charity – and almost immediately the group turned around wrote an only slightly smaller check to his campaign fund!) Hoffa’s lawyers, who’d spent their careers working for cosa nostra controlled local unions, were very good at spotting union related financial shenanigans (since they themselves had often been ACTIVELY INVOLVED in union related fraud!) so they picked up the trail right away. So it was no contest – it was clear that Carey, TDU and their fundraisers had blatantly violated Judge Edelstein’s consent decree. It was all the feds could do to get Carey sworn in and to drag their feet about actually enforcing the consent decree against Carey. Meanwhile, the UPS and freight agreements came up again. This time, Carey didn’t even try to call even a limited freight strike, he basically settled the 1997 – 2000 NMFA on the Motor Freight Carriers Association’s terms – including giving the carriers a two tier wage scale. New hires would only get 75% of teamster pay – it would take them 2 full years to get up to 100% of NMFA scale. Time was on the carriers’ side here. Beyond Carey’s political problems, there was also the NAFTA Effect. The “NAFTA Corridor” (Laredo, Texas to Chicago) had rapidly become the busiest road freight route in the entire world. And almost all of that freight was carried non union. An Irving, Texas-based carrier called Central Freight was the main less than truckload carrier on the route (their home terminal in Irving was the largest trucking terminal on the face of the earth – employing over 10,000 workers). Consolidated Freightways had it’s non union Con Way carriers on the NAFTA Corridor route too, and Yellow had it’s non union Saia and Jevic division, and Roadway’s non union side Viking was there too, as was UPS’s non union UPS Logistics division, and the non union divisions of USF, and NationsWay’s double breasted NFI division. And, of course, FedEx Logistics was on that route too - as was Overnite Transportation. And all the non union truckload carriers were there too – JL England, JB Hunt, Schneider, ect There weren’t any major union truckload carriers on that route - since there really weren’t any major union truckload carriers left. Of course Consolidated Freightways, Yellow, Roadway, USF and ABF all had their union trucks on the NAFTA Corridor too, but the route was overwhelmingly non union. This should have been a golden opportunity for organizing.

All of those carriers had their main US/Mexico border terminals in just one city – Laredo, Texas, where over 40,000 dockworkers were employed by the carriers and the local warehouses that took Mexican freight off Mexican trucks and put it on US trucks. And almost all of the NAFTA Corridor carriers – union and non union – had terminals in the Dallas-Ft Worth area to service the route – including the main NAFTA Corridor LTL carrier, Central Freight, in Irving, Texas. Central Freight’s huge non union terminal was literally just across the street from Yellow Freight’s union terminal in Irving! But neither the IBT Organizing Department nor the IBT Freight Division made the slightest effort to unionize these workers. It’s possible that they might have been uncomfortable with leading 50,000 workers in struggle in a right to work state – a state that was right on the border of Mexico’s industrial zone and it’s militant radicalized workers. Tyson Johnson, the president of Dallas/Ft Worth local 745, the only freight local on the Texas segment of the NAFTA Corridor, must have been equally as scared of the thought of his small, insular, conservative local having to lead a major strike and then having a 2,000% membership increase overnight. It was far better for Carey, the IBT Organizing Department, the Freight Division and Tyson Johnson’s local 745 to leave well enough alone and leave those 50,000 workers non union - even if it pretty much guaranteed the continuing decline of the unionized freight sector. Carey had another problem with the National Master UPS Agreement. Because of the chronic shrinkage of the IBT (from 2.3 million members in 1970 to barely 1.4 in 1997), most Teamsters Union pension plans were underfunded. The funds were paying pensions for lots of workers who’s employers were either bankrupt or deunionized – and the dwindling number of unionized carriers were having to pick up the tab for the legacy costs of their deunionized competitors. UPS, by far the largest teamster employer, had the biggest legacy costs – because of the part timer situation. Most of the company’s 80,000 part timers either quit or became too disabled to keep working there after only 4 months – but, UPS had to make pension contributions on their behalf – contributions they’d never collect, since you have to be covered by a pension plan for 5 years to be eligible to collect even a partial pension. UPS was tired of making those pension fund contributions to cover costs that their formerly union competitors should be paying. They had much better use for that money – an ambitious expansion plan. UPS had traditionally shunned the capital markets and had financed every major expansion in the company’s history through reinvestment of company profits. This expansion needed every extra dollar they could spare – and by not making pension fund contributions on low seniority part timers, UPS would save several million dollars. UPS proposed to set up a private pension plan – which would pay full timers pensions a third higher than any Teamsters pension fund, and which would not cover the part timers at all (a non issue, since few part timers stayed at UPS long enough to collect a pension). The IBT desperately needed the pension money – the Central States Pension Fund in particular had been hard hit by the deunionization of freight and the much lower rates of return it had gotten since the feds took it over. It didn’t matter that, objectively speaking, UPS full timers – who were career UPS employees who would almost certainly stick around long enough to retire from Big Brown - would be far better off under the UPS pension plan – since the plan would pay them a lot more. For most part timers, UPS was a transitional job that they would eventually quit decades before they were pensionable, so pension coverage was irrelevant for them. The IBT was bleeding red ink – so they would fight UPS for the cash, no matter what UPS workers actually needed. They couldn’t actually tell that to the UPS workers, of course! Instead, Carey, and Ken Hall, the head of the IBT Small Package division, made a demand that the company create full time jobs for about 20,000 high seniority part timers (by UPS standards, 1 or 2 years was “high seniority” for a part timer) by not replacing low seniority part timers when they leave and giving their hours to “high seniority” part timers. This plan had a thousand loopholes in it, so even if UPS went for it, they’d be able to evade it – and, more importantly, it was a great propaganda demand. Carey’s public relations people used this demand to present him as this great defender of America’s part time workers – a useful way of evading all the bad publicity about the money laundering! It also helped Carey that, in general, the Wall Street financiers didn’t like UPS – precisely because of it’s independence from the banks, and they wanted to keep the Teamsters Union in pro Wall Street anti trucking carrier hands – and that meant that it was in Wall Street’s interest to preserve the Carey regime and the federal monitorship. Internally within the Teamsters Union, Carey was able to present himself to UPS part timers as their defender – they might not buy the whole package, but at least he’ d be able to prevent them from actively scabbing on a national UPS strike. To non UPS teamsters, Carey could present himself as a militant who was willing to fight for the more marginal teamsters – and as the defender of the pensions of the more highly paid, stablely employed and relatively privileged teamsters. The first part (Carey as defender of the poorer part time teamsters) was a lie. The second part (Carey as defender of the pensions of the more privileged better paid teamsters) was only partially true. Carey’s priority was preserving the financial stability of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as an institution. Like his predecessors Frank Fitzsimmons, Roy Williams and Jackie Presser, Carey knew that preserving the IBT funds financially might mean sacrificing the pensions of many individual teamsters. As for the feds – they knew that Carey was in jeopardy of being ousted from office - a wildly successful UPS strike could save him. So, Carey called the first ever national United Parcel Service workers strike. UPS tried to maintain limited service with supervisors and a handful of UPS full timers who scabbed – but that was impossible. Also, the US Department of Labor actually ordered UPS not to hire scabs – a first in American labor history. Without outside scabs, there was no way UPS could break the strike. Beyond the support from the Clinton White House and the feds, the UPS strike also got amazingly positive media coverage. Normally anti union media outlets painted Carey as a hero of American workers and a fighter for the nation’s millions of part timers. It was all a big lie – the real issue was pension fund control, and at no time did the IBT demand full time jobs for all UPS part timers or wage parity between part time workers and full timers. You’d never know any of that from the laudatory press coverage that Carey got – and the mountains of praise he received from the American left, first and foremost TDU, Solidarity and Labor Notes magazine. UPS settled after one month Carey got to keep control over the pension funds - the real reason for the strike. Also, 2,000 high seniority part timers got full time jobs and UPS promised to give full time jobs to another 20,000 part timers at some vague point in the future (the propaganda issue that Carey had falsely claimed was the reason for the strike). UPS used the massive loopholes in the part timer clauses of the agreement to not actually give any of those 20,000 high seniority part time workers full time jobs – only the first 2,000 part timers got their full time jobs. Worse yet, Carey gave UPS a 5 year agreement – to date, the longest term contract between the Teamsters and an employer. From this, the corporate media and the far left declared a Grand-And-Glorious- Victory-For-American-Labor and proclaimed Ron Carey to be a great hero and the secular patron saint of the American labor movement. Meanwhile, Hoffa’s lawyers had finally gotten a federal court to actually enforce Judge Edelstein’s Consent Decree, and call a new IBT general election. Carey was barred from running in this election, because of his money laundering – and Barbara Zach Quindel was removed from her role as the government lawyer running the elections. The feds were very upset about this – but one of the consequences of taking control of Teamsters Union internal affairs was that even the feds’ allies in the union had to follow the consent decree just like Hoffa’s people did. Almost immediately, Solidarity concocted a conspiracy theory that this was some kind of government “retaliation” against Carey for the “great victory” of the UPS strike! Sadly, many labor activists still believe that conspiracy theory to this very day. That’s truly unfortunate, because Solidarity’s conspiracy theory was a total lie. In the real world, the feds had helped Carey every step of the way – even with the UPS strike, where, for the first time in history, the government actually banned an employer from hiring scabs. But it was politically impossible for the Clinton Administration to blatantly violate the law by keeping Carey in office – as much as Clinton and the Democrats needed Carey in that post, they still couldn’t keep him in office, unless they wanted to stage a coup d’etat in the IBT (and realistically there was no way they could do that – the political fallout would just be too much). The re-run of the election was scheduled for 1998, to fill the remaining 3 years of Carey’s term – James P.

“Junior” Hoffa was the opposition candidate, of course. TDU’s replacement for Carey was Tom Leedham. He was the president of Teamsters local 206, a supermarket warehouse workers local based in Portland, Oregon and covering the whole state. Leedham was also the first openly gay man to ever run for general president of the Teamsters Union. He was also a registered Democrat with open ties to TDU. Leedham wasn’t nearly as well known as Carey, he hadn’t had the years of good press coverage that Carey had enjoyed and he couldn’t hide behind conservative “family values” like the married Republican Catholic ex Marine Carey could. Worse yet, as the principal officer of a warehouse local, he had to take the weight of years of deteriorating conditions and unionbusting in the supermarket sector. Thanks to competition from Wal-Mart out in the suburbs on the one hand and low wage non union 99 cent stores, bodegas and delis in the cities on the other, the big supermarket chains had been demanding labor concessions from their unions for almost 20 years at that point. The main supermarket union, the United Food and Commercial Workers, couldn’t give that much – they represented the cashiers, stock clerks and butchers in the stores and their membership had already been reduced to minimum wage part time transitional job status…there wasn’t much more for them to give up. That left the Teamsters Union. The warehouses had already won the right to fire warehouse workers for “violating production methods” (a legal euphemism for firing workers for working too slow – because Teamsters Union contracts don’t allow firing for working too slow, but do allow workers to be fired for violating the employer’s production methods) The pay had been cut to close to rock bottom, workers were pushed to the limit and spied on by elaborate state of the art surveillance technology to make sure that the company got 5,000 pounds of product moved per worker per day OR ELSE. Now, they were going after the drivers – by subcontracting delivery driving work to non union companies, or to Teamsters Union-represented companies with lower pay scales, by cutting mileage rates, by making workers do extra work for the same pay, by lengthening the work day and by surveillance on the roads. 200,000 warehouse teamsters had lost their jobs – and for the 400,000 remaining, it had become a truly miserable job. Many warehouse workers – correctly – blamed the union’s leaders for all of this – ALL of the leaders, from local presidents like Leedham all the way up to the top. So, Leedham could not count on their support – nor could he get the automatic support of the minority of UPS workers who voted like Carey could. He couldn’t even count on the money from TDU’s friends in the Democratic Party – because the Carey investigation had put a lot of heat on professional fundraisers, so it was too risky for them to bankroll Leedham the way they did Carey. Junior Hoffa was also running a much more militant sounding campaign in 1998. He attacked Carey from the left for his organizing failures and the falling standard of living of most teamsters and he promised to resolve all of the outstanding labor disputes the union was involved in – including Overnite Transportation. Unlike the last election, where Hoffa had proposed that the IBT stop even trying to be a freight union, this time Hoffa promised to organize in the freight sector. It worked - Hoffa roundly defeated Leedham in the election, carrying every sector of the union, including warehouse and UPS. Of course, over 80% of teamsters didn’t even bother to vote for either one – the same as in 1991 and 1996. James P.

Hoffa (known as “Jim” to friends and supporters – “Junior” to opponents and enemies) was sworn in to office in 1999. Carey went back home to Queens, was able to beat the federal criminal charges arising from his campaign financing fraud, was expelled for life from the IBT (by the same federal tribunal that had expelled so many of his wiseguy enemies) went into retirement and died of lung cancer in 2008. To many in labor and on the left, Ron Carey is still a hero (all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding). And Leedham went back to his warehouse workers local in Oregon (he’d hedged his bets by hanging on to his day job while running for the IBT general presidency). As for Junior Hoffa – now, he had to live up to his campaign promises. He hit the ground running – fired all of Carey’s staffers, appointed his own people in their places (Hoffa’s appointees were predominantly former teamsters – unlike Carey’s, many of whom were non teamsters who had been parachuted in from the staff of the United Mine Workers of America or the far left) and right away Hoffa tackled the Anheuser Busch brewery workers contract fight. The A-B brewery workers (makers of the famous Budweiser beer) got a settlement – not a great one, but it was tolerable. Then Junior decided to deal with the Overnite situation. He revived the campaign and ordered every Teamster freight local to assign a business agent or staffer to approach the workers in their local terminals. Despite the repression, there were still large numbers of OVNT freight workers who wanted to go union. Hoffa – who had promised to “resolve” the OVNT conflict, as well as every other outstanding Teamsters Union labor dispute, quickly, had decided to carry out a quick organizing drive – and if OVNT management didn’t recognize the IBT right away, he would call a national strike. That’s exactly what happened – Union Pacific Railroad refused to recognize the unions, so the Teamsters called a strike at every one of OVNT’s 138 US terminals. About 2,000 of OVNT’s 10,000 workers honored the strike call – and OVNT actually had to shut down terminals in a number of areas. And, by the low standards of late 20th century American strikes, the OVNT strike was remarkably militant. OVNT terminals were picketed regularly, and in many areas Teamster roving pickets followed OVNT city trucks to picket them as they made their rounds. Of course, considering the reality of the heavily deunionized workforce of 1999, there were few workplaces where those picketlines made a difference. Also, and most critically, the Teamsters Union did not picket Union Pacific’s railroad terminals. Since UPRR’s train crews and terminal workers were 100% union, those pickets would have been decisive – it could have easily shut down UPRR’s entire system. And that would have a major effect on the American economy – UPRR had just absorbed the Southern Pacific Railroad, and now the merged UPRR and SPRR systems hauled almost all of the freight between the Midwest and California. If the UPRR system was strikebound, almost all of America’s industrial exports to the Far East would be left sitting on pallets in Chicago warehouses, and almost all of America’s imports from Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea would be sitting in seafreight containers out on the piers of San Francisco and Los Angeles, or riding at anchor in the holds of cargo ships off the California coast. That would be a world shaking development – and would almost certainly have led to enormous pressure from the capitalist class as a whole being put on Union Pacific to make a deal with the Teamsters – on the IBT’s terms! But Hoffa was afraid to go that far – it would be too dangerous to lead a struggle like that – the Teamsters Union might just win, and he might be forced to launch an industrywide freight organizing drive. So, Junior Hoffa – like Carey before him – let the OVNT strike go down to defeat. Some of the strikers returned to work – but about a thousand of them didn’t – the freight locals did try and find them alternative employment, but it didn’t make the strike any less of a demoralizing defeat. Meanwhile, a number of the few remaining union road freight carriers were trying to either go all non union or get completely out of the business. Preston – the 151 line, a major East Coast LTL carrier, decided to close it’s doors, and lay off all of it’s employees. St Johnsbury, another Eastern LTL carrier, also went under, laying off all of it’s teamsters as well. Out in the Intermountain West, NationsWay decided to shut down it’s Denver-based unionized division while keeping it’s non union double breasted outfit, the also Denver-based NFI, on the road. It wasn’t because NationsWay’s owner was broke – he’d just started an expansion Major League Baseball team, the Colorado Rockies, in a brand new stadium! But it was just more profitable to use all non union freight workers – so his union company had to go. NationsWay shut down so quickly that some of the firm’s East Coast drivers found out they were jobless by listening to talk radio newscasts! The NationsWay casuals and low seniority workers were lucky – they got laid off right away, got all of their unpaid vacation pay and their last checks didn’t bounce! The high seniority NationsWay workers who stuck around for another 2 weeks to deliver all the freight left in NationsWay’s terminals got rubber checks – and they got stiffed out of their vacation pay! NFI picked up NationsWay’s old customers (and even some of NationsWay’s old trucks and trailers). These mass layoffs – and the OVNT defeat – naturally cast a pall over the 2000 NMFA and National Master UPS Agreement negotiations.

UPS and the union freight carriers got pretty much everything they wanted at the table. The feds were very unhappy at this turn of events – they’d lost control of the general presidency to a man who was loyal to the interests of the trucking companies, rather than to the interests of their clients, Corporate America. The White House wasn’t thrilled either – unlike Carey, who had made major IBT campaign contributions to President Clinton in 1996, Hoffa refused to bankroll Vice President Al Gore’s presidential bid, or Hillary Clinton’s senate race in New York. Instead, Hoffa followed the path of Frank Fitzsimmons and Jackie Presser and backed the Republicans. As for the carriers – put it this way, “Traffic World” – a major freight industry trade paper – wrote an article about how the freight industry bosses viewed the Teamsters Union’s general president. The title? “In Love With Hoffa”. Meanwhile, back on the loading docks… There were a few small bright spots on the horizon. In Chicago, the hub of the American freight industry, the independent Chicago Truck Drivers Union, which had disaffiliated from the IBT after the disastrous Montgomery Ward strike in 1905, finally came back to the IBT. The CTDU had suffered a sharp membership decline, falling from 10,000 workers to only 3,500, so it’s leadership decided to merge with Teamsters local 710. In New York City’s commercial movers local 814, a group of TDU members forced the local’s leadership to call a strike against the office furniture moving companies. The strike – called in July, at the height of the commercial building season – was one of the most militant and effective construction drivers strikes in the city in nearly a century, and quickly got a settlement on the movers’ terms. This was entirely due to that small group of TDU movers mobilizing their own strike committee, and using bands of cell phone dispatched roving pickets to stop office furniture deliveries at office buildings in Midtown Manhattan. These workers proved that it really was possible to win truck drivers strikes – all it took was militant leadership who weren’t afraid to take risks and fight back against the bosses. Income and working conditions decay continued industrywide – especially on the non union side, which was leading some unorganized freight workers to look to the Teamsters Union. The Teamsters port trucker campaign continued on the piers – especially in the West and the South, but was still stalled, largely by IBT footdragging (Hoffa didn’t want to ruffle freight carrier feathers by being too aggressive here either) – so the anti trust excuse was still being used to prevent strike action on the piers. George Cashman – the $ 600,000 man from Boston who worked part time at 5 separate full time jobs, 4 with the IBT and one with MASSPORT – was still the head of the Teamsters Port Truckers Division. Cashman had jumped ship from Carey and TDU when it was obvious they would lose, and became a born again old guard Hoffa loyalist. Also, out in the NAFTA Corridor, workers at Central Freight, the biggest LTL carrier on that route, had actually approached the Teamsters about unionization. Initially, union support was very heavy in the non union carrier’s 10,000 worker freight barn in Irving, Texas – and this should have been a slam dunk win for the Teamsters Union. The only problem was Tyson Johnson. He was the head of Dallas/Ft Worth Teamsters local 745, and an IBT international vice president and the head of the IBT Freight Division Yes, yet another IBT officer with 3 different full time jobs! 120 hours a week! In two different cities! 1,500 miles apart! And for the bargain price (by Teamsters standards) of “only” $ 150,000 a year! Tyson Johnson also had his own private goon squad – who terrorized teamsters who dared to disagree with him. Like Union Pacific’s OVNT SWAT, Johnson’s goons were very tech savvy – they actually bragged about their teamster-on-teamster violence on TeamsterNet, a popular teamster internet bulletin board site. Johnson’s thugs regularly terrorized teamsters at their jobs – including the freight workers at Yellow Freight Systems. Occasionally, the goons would drag workers into a tunnel under the loading dock at the Yellow Freight terminal in Irving, which happened to be right across the street from Central Freight’s terminal. At their anti union captive audience meetings, Central Freight arranged for Yellow Freight workers who had been victims of Tyson Johnson’s goon squad beatings to speak to Central Freight workers about their horrible experiences. That turned a pro union group of workers – who had longed for the high wages and mileage rates that Yellow Freight workers earned – into workers who did not want to be in the IBT. This caused the IBT to lose the NLRB election at Central Freight by a very high margin – the Teamsters did win the election at a tiny 20 worker Central Freight terminal in Las Vegas, but they lost the 10,000 workers at Irving, who were the decisive bargaining unit at the company, and the key to unionizing the NAFTA Corridor LTL freight carrier workforce. There were other bad developments on the horizon. Roadway set up a small package operation to compete with unionized UPS, non union FedEx and double breasted Airborne Express. It was called Roadway Package Systems – it’s name was as close to UPS as they could get without being sued and it’s trucks were the same white with blue and orange trim as FedEx’ trucks were. The drivers were owner operators who had to purchase their own vehicles, and who were paid a flat fee for each box delivered, rather than an hourly wage. This guaranteed that sweatshop labor conditions would prevail at the company – since the owner operators had to cover their truck payment, insurance, diesel fuel, repair costs, parking tickets, uniform cleaning costs and have enough to live on out of their modest per package fee. Meanwhile, Hoffa did take some serious steps to unionize the 20,000 non union workers at Airborne Express. To be technical, they didn’t actually work for Airborne – all of Airborne Express’ 7,000 employees at the New York/New Jersey local delivery operation and the pilots and air freight handlers at JFK, Newark and Dayton (Ohio) International Airport were teamsters. But all the other workers who delivered Airborne packages in the rest of the country worked for non union subcontractors. The Teamsters Union was finally – after over 30 years – actually doing something about organizing those workers. The Airborne Express organizing campaign stands out as one of the few freight worker organizing success stories of the last 30 years. Hoffa did have other priorities – like getting the feds out of the union. It was presented to the members as an expense issue – and indeed, having a team of high salaried government lawyers being paid from the IBT general fund cost a lot of money – but the real issue was control over the IBT as an institution. Hoffa – unlike Carey – had a stable social base in the union (the local officers, in particular the leaders of freight and construction locals, and more importantly, the social base that kept those officers in power, the better paid and more privileged of their members)




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